


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


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## Improving Operational Capabilities: The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Headquarters

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ADVANCED AMPHIBIOUS STUDY GROUP  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

## CONCEPT PAPER

IMPROVING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES:  
THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS

May 1982

### AASG Contributors

LtCol L. L. Weeks, USMC  
Col J. E. Toth, USMC

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20380

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## MEMORANDUM

From: Director, Advanced Amphibious Study Group

Subj: Improving Operational Capabilities: The Marine Air-Ground Task Force Headquarters

1. This concept paper is one of a series which attempts to answer a question posed by the Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff last year: "What do we need to do to become more capable [of providing rapidly deployable/employable forces]?"
2. In attempting to answer the question, we have sought methods which improve Marine Corps capabilities worldwide, in recognition that today's defense vogue may not represent the expeditionary commitment which real world events could present us in the future. The approach has been to focus on developing concepts for improvement (in accordance with the AASG charter, MCO 3930.1) of operational capabilities with general recommendations for implementation. These latter vary in their specificity in accordance with the subject material. While the completed project will feature a great number of proposals, they should be viewed as options for improving USMC operational capabilities over the next five to ten years. It is not intended that they all be implemented simultaneously. Many of the target areas have been chosen because they get submerged in the cross-over in HQMC staff responsibilities or they fail to receive attention in the annual budget process. By and large, they are all fundamental issues which have broad and continuing impact on how well the Marine Corps carries out its expeditionary responsibilities.
3. In his book The Military Staff, Its History and Development, BGen J. D. Hittle, USMC (Ret.) draws attention to the "virtue in building the military brain before the military body." That appears to have merit, and accordingly, this endeavor has looked first at tuning up the military "brain." Accordingly, we have examined those factors dealing with the employment of our operational capabilities -- MAGTF headquarters, operational planning, development of operational concepts and doctrine, and, fundamentally, the operational competence of our officer corps.
4. This paper deals with the organization, staffing, and training of the MAGTF headquarters which are the "quarter-backs" of our air-ground logistic teams and which were not addressed in the Marine Corps Force Structure Study. Clearly


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Subj: Improving Operational Capabilities: The Marine Air-  
Ground Task Force Headquarters

the expeditionary success or failure of the MAGTF as a whole in response to NCA, theater commander or fleet commander tasking rides on the capabilities of the MAGTF command element. These capabilities have not received a great deal of attention in the past, despite our staunch advocacy of the MAGTF concept.



J. E. TOTH

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## IMPROVING OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES: THE MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Battles may be won with deficiencies in equipment, force size, and sustaining supplies; history provides any number of examples where how the force was employed was of greater significance than what the force comprised. Indeed, no advantage in numbers of weaponry can offset the debilitation of poor operational direction against a foe. Consistent operational excellence is achieved through development of competent, resourceful commanders and skilled staffs to advise and assist them. Accordingly, there is a need to ensure that the level of command -- the MAGTF headquarters -- which is directly responsible for employing Fleet Marine Forces in support of a fleet commander, joint force commander, theater commander or the NCA is organized, staffed, and trained for the task.

Both doctrine and practice call for ad hoc fabrication of MAGTF headquarters when required, although several headquarters have some degree of permanence. FMFM 0-1 recognizes the need for on-hand command elements, stipulating that each MAF headquarters has the responsibility to maintain one MAB on an operational or nucleus basis and an additional MAB staff nucleus on an additional duty basis. The problem is one of simultaneous demands -- deployments, training, planning, prospective crisis employment -- which quickly exceed available MAGTF headquarters elements, regardless of their ability to deploy. Prospective incorporation of MPS extends the problem further.

A factor influencing types and numbers of MAGTF headquarters is management of contingency responsibilities. At present, there are some 40 MAF/MAB force obligations addressed in current operational planning, not counting plan variations and alternative concepts. Clearly, with the breadth and uncertainty of prospective employments and the limited number of command elements, exclusive dedication of a MAGTF headquarters to a specific plan should be avoided, save in the face of a developing situation. Each headquarters will undoubtedly have a family of plans on which to orient, but its charter and training must ensure that each is capable of planning and executing an unanticipated expeditionary requirement. What may be a high visibility plan today can be submerged overnight with the day-to-day changes in world events. Additionally, specialization drives up the total number of headquarters. Neither does MPS require a separate MAGTF headquarters; air movement and force assembly in the objective area do not, of themselves, require a designated MAB command element.

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Once doctrine and SOPs have been established for MPS, all MAB command elements should be capable of planning and executing such a deployment.

The principal factors requiring MAGTF headquarters for day-to-day operations are availability for prospective expeditionary employment and peacetime training exercises.

MAF. While the lack of amphibious shipping and the character of war at its outset (defensive, sea control, lack of detailed campaign planning, problematic logistics pipeline, etc.) tend to preclude MAF-size operations initially, there is a need to retain a MAF headquarters capability in peacetime for (1) readiness for contingencies short of war, (2) coordination of MAB/MAU commitments, and (3) to coordinate the operational activities of the DWT. As long as there are three such teams postured separately around the world, there will be a requirement for three MAF headquarters.

MAB. The MAB is the operational workhorse of the FMF. Operations in the transition from peace to general war and unilateral expeditionary requirements will demand the initial commitment of MABs, perhaps to be built up to MAFs as time progresses or shipping can be concentrated in one ocean or another. Operational contingencies together with an annual requirement to join allies in training exercises demand well staffed, competent MAB headquarters. Since major MAB exercises tend to fix a MAB in one location for as much as two months, there is a need for an additional MAB headquarters to serve as a backup for contingencies/lesser exercises. Two MABs per DWT would provide the nuclei for expansion to upwards of six MAF headquarters in general war.

MAU. MAUs will be required not only for peacetime forward deployment but also for general war. During peacetime, they continue available for naval posturing in support of foreign policy, demonstrations, evacuations, raids, coup de main, and "spearhead" operations in preparation for follow-on forces. In general war, they will serve as raid forces and be used for strategic distraction. Our current approach is to have two MAU headquarters available for "port and starboard" duty in LANT and PAC. It works.

There are solid requirements for maintenance of full-time MAGTF headquarters; this should be recognized in both doctrine and in organization. Each division/wing/FSSG base has need for a MAF and two MAB command elements; additionally, there is a requirement for four permanent MAU headquarters. However, the manpower cost of maintaining fully structured MAF, MAB, and MAU headquarters is prohibitive. That notwithstanding, there are some ways that mutually supporting

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MAGTF headquarters elements can be organized to give the requisite operational capability while keeping down the manpower costs.


While three different organizational concepts are explored, Option One (the Modular Headquarters) is the recommended approach. In Option One, a MAF command group is comprised of a family of modules (see picture below), using two MAB headquarters (complete with H&S companies) and a MAF planning headquarters as an organizational foundation. One of the MAB headquarters provides up to two MAU headquarters as required. These modules can be employed in various combinations.

- The MAF headquarters is represented by a planning module which is capable of planning for MAF-size operations and coordinating the activities of lesser, uncommitted MAGTF headquarters. It would not be capable of independent operations or have a T/E. It can be separately organized (e.g., I MAF) or it can be provided by an FMF headquarters (e.g., II MAF). For MAF-level commitments, the MAF planning module attaches to the MAB headquarters to provide a full-fledged MAF command capability.

- An operational MAB headquarters is developed which is fully staffed together with an H&S Company that would permit the MAB headquarters to be autonomous. In addition to separate MAB-level operations, the MAB headquarters serves as the battle staff for the MAF commander upon amalgamation with the MAF planning module.

- A second MAB headquarters which is capable of participating in exercises, providing MAU headquarters for afloat deployments, and, in the absence of the first MAB headquarters, serving as the command nucleus for an operational requirement for a MAB or MAF, with proper augmentation. This MAB planning headquarters would be supported by a nucleus H&S Company that would possess all of its T/E, the bulk of which would be preserved (e.g., the H&S Co., III MAF model) but only part of its personnel. The two MAU headquarters would, when combined with the MAB module and H&S augmentation, form a headquarters similar in nature and capability to the operational MAB headquarters.

## MAF COMMAND GROUP



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While this concept is capable of fielding MAF, MAB, and MAU command elements, the greatest emphasis is placed on the MAB as an immediately employable element and as the battle staff for a MAF headquarters. Depending on the need, the MAF Module could be attached to the MAB headquarters at the outset or could be flown into an objective area to join a committed MAB headquarters for the purpose of converting a MAB operation into a MAF operation. The MAB commander becomes Chief of Staff of the MAF upon the arrival of the MAF commander. For MAB requirements, the operational MAB headquarters is augmented with specialist detachments (communications, intelligence, etc.) and assigned major subordinate commands by the FMF commander in order to be capable of performing the operations listed in FMFM 0-1 for MABs. This headquarters, in addition to conducting exercises, would be prepared for all contingencies -- to include MPS. The second MAB headquarters would orient primarily on the continuing requirement to provide afloat MAU headquarters, while retaining the capability to build the deployed MAU headquarters to MAB level or even to MAF level with amalgamation of the MAF-MAB-MAU modules. It, too, must be capable of planning and executing amphibious, air movement, MPS, and administrative introduction.

The various options require approximately the same manpower resources, since the functions supported are the same throughout. The personnel increases in manning levels throughout the active structure (in addition to manning levels existing for current MAGTF structures) to support Option 1 are shown below in comparison to the cost of fielding three MPS-type brigade headquarters (7th MAB model). It should be kept in mind that none of the existing MAGTF headquarters (except III MAF) have a deployable H&S capability -- a shortfall Option One would rectify.

## MANNING LEVEL INCREASES

	<u>Option One</u>	<u>3-MPS Bdes</u>
Marine officer	115	156
enlisted	326	360
Navy officer	26	15
enlisted	24	45

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## Proposed MAGTF Distribution within the Marine Corps<sup>1</sup>

<u>MAGTF COMPONENT</u>	<u>FMFLant</u>	<u>FMFPac (E)</u>	<u>FMFPac (W)</u>
MAF Plan Hq	II MAF	I MAF	III MAF
Opnl MAB Hq	4th MAB	7th MAB	9th MAB
MAB Plan Hq	6th MAB	5th MAB <sup>2</sup>	1st MAB <sup>3</sup>
MAU Hq	32d MAU		31st MAU
	34th MAU		37th MAU

### NOTES:

1. The proposed allocation based upon (1) current geographical locations of extant MAGTF Hqs, (2) the evolution of those structures into the proposed distribution, and (3) a knowledge of current and probable employment plans (contingencies).
2. No current operational requirements for MAU Hqs.
3. 1st Marine Brigade redesignated 1st MAB.

The MAGTF staff is the key to planning and execution of complex taskings -- amphibious warfare, joint and combined expeditionary service -- directly under the eye of the National Command Authority. Failures at this level affect the force as a whole as well as the mission toward which it is directed. Given the permanency of MAGTF headquarters, their performance is largely dependent upon their staffing and training. There are steps which can be taken on both counts to improve individual and team skills within the MAGTF headquarters.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

- Accept into doctrine and permanent active force structure one MAF and two MAB headquarters for each DWT; among other things, this will require converting 1st Brigade into 1st MAB. Additionally, maintain two full time MAU headquarters each in FMFPac and FMFLant. See proposed distribution above.
- Organize the MAGTF headquarters structure in accordance with Option 1.
- Implement through reorganization of current MAGTF Hq and through increases to end strength in a phased manner.

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- Organize Communications Battalion, FMF to support one MAF or two MABs.
- Retain sufficient ANGLICO forces in the active structure to ensure MAGTF headquarters joint and combined interoperability/mutual supportability.
- Develop MPS doctrine/SOPs; subsequently require all MAB Hq be capable of planning/executing MPS operations.
- Continue to manage MAGTF personnel staffing from HQMC.
- Provide incentives for MAGTF duty.
- Develop, in coordination with MCDEC and LFTCs, a MAGTF headquarters training program which will create required staff skills.
- Employ standardized staff techniques and documentation in day-to-day business throughout the operating force.
- Assign DC/S PP&O as the MAGTF sponsor for the purpose of coordinating the implementation plan contained in the basic study and for determining future adjustments to MAGTF headquarters organizational doctrine, T/Os, T/Es, and other related requirements.

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1. PROBLEM. To consider methods for improved operational direction and planning for Marine Air-Ground Task Forces.

2. DISCUSSION

a. Battles may be won with deficiencies in equipment, force size, and sustaining supplies; history provides any number of examples where how the force was employed was of greater significance than what the force comprised. Indeed, no advantage in numbers of weaponry can offset the debilitation of poor operational direction against a skilled foe. Tactical and strategic excellence are the greatest "force multipliers" which a nation can provide its armed forces; yet such provision enjoys less visibility and takes less money than equipment-oriented programs which increasingly dominate defense thinking. Consistent operational excellence is achieved through development of competent, resourceful commanders and skilled staffs to advise and assist them. This is a matter not only of selection and training but also of organizing them into capable, responsive headquarters. This paper addresses the latter requirement -- the organizational framework for operational direction.

b. The Marine Corps MAGTF command element potentially enjoys several advantages over the joint Army/USAF counterpart. It possesses a uniform doctrinal foundation; it provides for truly centrally managed antiair warfare, avoiding the divided joint air defense relationships and responsibilities conveyed in JCS Pub. 8; it provides the potential for coordinated air/ground intelligence collection and electronics warfare; it provides for optimum airspace control; and it is potentially well suited for joint and combined collaboration -- either as a component element or as an organizational nucleus. However, there are a variety of problems which impede realization of its considerable operational potential, each of which will be discussed at length:

(1) Numbers of headquarters. There are no permanent MAGTF headquarters in the structure; both doctrine and practice call for ad hoc fabrication when required, although several have some degree of permanence. There is a tendency to generate a MAB and MAU headquarters (e.g., 6th and 8th MAB) for training and planning purposes well beyond the capacity of the parent division/wing/FSSG to provide either adequate headquarters staffing or GCE/ACE/CSSE forces. This tendency is further complicated by MPS, which suggests the association of a specific unit and a specific MAGTF headquarters with a particular set of MPS equipment. Piecemeal proliferation of command elements tends to dilute the quality of operational direction by spreading staffing resources too thin and fostering employment/deployment specialization.

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(2) Organizational Concept. While we routinely deploy MAU's, we employ MAB's. Whether for training, unexpected crisis response, or the initial phase of a general war, the MAB is key to our ability to rapidly employ significant expeditionary forces and to build to MAF level. However, our approach impedes the deployability of this level MAGTF headquarters by dependence on ad hoc staffing, organization and equipping.

(3) MAGTF Headquarters Competence. This is a function of staffing priorities, tour lengths, and staff training. A headquarters pieced together with division/wing/FSSG augmentation prior to an exercise or operation will not perform as well as a staff which has trained together for months and years and which receives consistently high quality staffing input. If we expect the national leadership to place the burden of high-visibility expeditionary service on the Marine Corps, we must develop the institutional wherewithal and the confidence of the unified commanders in our ability to plan and to command effectively.

## c. Numbers of Headquarters

(1) The fundamental guidance, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine (FMFM 0-1) states that the MAGTF is not a permanent organization; rather, it is task organized for a specific mission, following the completion of which it is dissolved. However, it recognizes a need for on-hand MAGTF command elements, stipulating that each MAF headquarters has the responsibility to maintain one MAB on an operational or nucleus basis and an additional MAB staff nucleus on an additional duty basis. Each MAF headquarters maintains MAU staffs as required. FMFM 0-1 goes on to indicate that the Reserve structure will provide one MAB and two MAU staffs on an operational or nucleus/additional duty basis. The problem is one of simultaneous demands -- deployments, training, planning, prospective crisis employment -- which quickly exceed available MAGTF headquarters elements, regardless of their ability to deploy. Prospective incorporation of the MPS concept extends the problem further. Yet FMFM 0-1 goes on to say that MAGTF headquarters do not occupy the permanent status which attends division, wing, and other more traditional headquarters. The following is a list of the MAGTF headquarters currently formed for various day-to-day tasks short of operational commitment in response to an initiating directive. Clearly the existence of such a list gives question to the doctrinal impermanence of the MAGTF command element.

I MAF	4th MAB	31st MAU
II MAF	6th MAB	32d MAU
III MAF	7th MAB	34th MAU
	8th MAB	37th MAU
	9th MAB	



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(2) There is a need to identify the number of MAGTF headquarters which are required and reasonably attainable during normal conditions. Current Marine Corps doctrine is inconsistent regarding the number of MAGTFs which can be employed from a division/wing/FSSG base. FMFM 0-1 states that there are sufficient command and control assets to form one MAF, two MABs, or four MAUs simultaneously. On the other hand, Antiair Warfare (FMFM 5-5) states that the MAG organized to support a MAB could well require over half the Wing's combat capability. As an illustrative point, 7th MAB currently requires over 90 percent of 3d MAW command and control assets. FMFM 5-5 goes on to say that Fleet Marine Forces are capable of deploying only one MAB from each division/wing/FSSG team for extended periods and that deployment of two MAB's from that base should not be planned.

(3) The revised draft (December 1980) of the Marine Corps Force Structure Study asserts that Communications Battalion assets are adequate for the support of a MAF headquarters and, with augmentation from Division Communications Company and Marine Wing Communications Squadron, should have the requisite assets to support two deploying MABs. This is based on the presumption that deployment of two MABs will take the preponderance of division/wing ground and aviation forces while leaving the division and wing communications assets uncommitted. This is in error. First, the MWCS must provide resources for establishment of two MAB TACC's as well as establish linking communications among the various aviation facilities dispersed for passive defense in the objective area. Second, Division Communications Company will be obliged to augment the regimental headquarters in two separate MAB ground combat elements for communications with reinforcing elements. Finally, the division and wing headquarters must be held in readiness for escalation -- planned or otherwise -- to eventual MAF organization. Accordingly, if two MAB headquarters are to deploy from one division/wing/FSSG base, the Communications Battalion must be separately capable of providing the requisite communications. Organization of the battalion into two mirror-image letter companies (MAB-oriented) with an H&S Company providing unique capabilities for attachment (WMMCS interface, satellite communications) is an option; see Enclosure (1). As the communications requirements for a MAB are almost the same as those of a MAF, the letter companies could support either size headquarters. Since MAUs operate from the sea-base using shipboard communications for limited objective operations, they are virtually unaffected by Communications Battalion organization or capabilities.

(4) A factor influencing types and numbers of MAGTF headquarters is management of contingency responsibilities. At present, there are some 40 MAF/MAG force obligations addressed in current operational planning, not counting

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plan variations and alternative concepts. Additionally, unplanned (NOPLAN) prospects for employment continue highly probable, especially for political reinforcement operations at MAU/MAB level. Clearly, with the breadth and uncertainty of prospective employments and the limited number of command elements, exclusive dedication of a MAGTF headquarters to only one contingency should be avoided, save in the face of a developing situation. Each headquarters will undoubtedly have a family of plans on which to orient, but its charter and training must ensure that each is capable of planning and executing an unanticipated expeditionary requirement. What may be a high visibility plan today (Norway reinforcement, SWA) can be submerged overnight with the day-to-day changes in world events. Specialization provides improved performance only if there is full assurance of employment exclusively to the task for which directed; otherwise, specialization must be viewed as an expeditionary limitation. If X MAB is specialized for an operation in the Mediterranean and is deployed for a training exercise in Northern Europe, Y MAB may be obliged to take an actual contingency developing concurrently in the Med. If X MAB is specialized for air movement and is the only headquarters available for a real world amphibious assault, it had best know how. Obviously, specialization drives up the total number of headquarters and reduces operational flexibility.

(a) The MPS concept is considered by some to require a specialized MPS MAB headquarters. Certainly this is appropriate for NTPS at the present time, in the absence of either MPS doctrine or SOPs or the existence of an approved operations plan for joint force employment/deployment. If the US is obliged to deploy forces to SWA, it must have some capability to do so. Seventh MAB provides such a capability today. However, in analyzing the requirement for additional MAB headquarters for three MPS sets of equipment, one must ask, "what does a headquarters do in deployment or employment which is unique to MPS?" In deployment, the command element is associated exclusively with air movement and force assembly in the objective area. Both of these functions can be done with a lesser deployment-oriented control element (e.g., similar to embarkation organization in the amphibious movement to the objective area), such as the deploying regimental or BSSG headquarters; it in no way requires a full air/ground/logistics headquarters. Accordingly, the only determinant for deployment of a fully capable MAB headquarters is the intended operational employment and task organization in-theater. If the NTPS/MPS force is the only force or the largest force deploying, sending a MAB command element is appropriate. If the NTPS/MPS force is reinforcing a MAF operation with a MAF command element in place, deployment of an additional MAB headquarters is superfluous.

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(b) A case in point is the recent planning for SWA which featured deployment of one MAF, three MAB and two MAU headquarters for a composite force which, at most, will require a MAF ashore and a MAB afloat. Proposals that the extra MAB headquarters might serve as interim Wing and Division headquarters in a composite MAF are viewed with considerable skepticism. Amphibious or expeditionary commitment is complex enough of itself without inflicting the deployed force with the extraordinary complications of either reconfiguration or functional substitution of the means for operational direction in the face of a competent opponent. If there is a need for a Wing command element, deploy a unit which is organized, trained, and equipped for the task -- a Wing headquarters.

(c) As noted before, MAGTF headquarters specialization is problematic. Seventh MAB is currently oriented -- even structured -- exclusively for NTPS commitment in SWA. Inasmuch as they are the only West Coast MAGTF command element formed and trained for any kind of operations, a tasking to provide a West Coast landing force for operations in the Aleutians, the Kuriles, or Korea would clearly require commitment of the 7th MAB headquarters with a task organization optimized for amphibious assault and/or antiair warfare. In such an event, the 7th MAB headquarters must be capable of performing successfully.

(d) Accordingly, once the doctrine and/or SOPs have been established for MPS, all MAB command elements should be capable of planning and executing such a deployment. None should be specialized exclusively for this task. However, there may be some desirability to maintain special NTPS/MPS sections within the FSSG to manage periodic inspection and maintenance of afloat resources and operational issuance in the objective area.

(5) Having looked at the requirements for contingency preparations in general and MPS planning in particular and finding no justifiable requirement to generate peacetime MAGTF command elements exclusively for specific contingency plans, there is a need to identify the number of MAGTF headquarters which are required for day-to-day operations. The principal factors are availability for prospective expeditionary employment and peacetime training exercises.

(a) MAF. While the force justification pressures of the PPBS drill, coupled with the "short war" postulation (hopefully dead or dying), have pushed the Marine Corps to seek amphibious employment of its MAF capability at the outset of general war hostilities, that is strategically illogical, transportationally improbable, and potentially destructive of a national capability which

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will be of greatest value in subsequent phases of the war. In any event, the problem of sea control in the initial stages of such a conflict renders early large scale amphibious operations improbable due to insecure transit and diversion of Fleet elements to other more pressing requirements. The nature of campaign planning -- particularly defensive -- focuses on the requirements for the initial phase without full regard for subsequent phases necessary for ultimate victory. Inasmuch as the first phase in a general war initiated by the USSR will demand commitment of forces predominantly to missions of delay and defense (a situation providing limited opportunity for decisive amphibious operations), specific amphibious objectives for the MAFs are limited -- even nonexistent -- at the outset. Yet history and fundamental logic tell us that such a capability will be required time and again (probably the last thing in Field Marshal Lord Gort's mind, as he deployed the BEF to France at the outset of WW II, was the need for a major amphibious capability). Accordingly, the MAF-level assaults come into their own after the United States and its allies move from the initial defensive phase to large scale offensive operations available to the theater commander for contingencies and opportunities beyond his visualization of the campaign at the time the plan was drafted. This will occur earlier in some theaters than others. MAFs committed at the outset to continental reinforcement will predictably become totally enmeshed in that role, leaving the requirement for generating follow-on national amphibious capabilities to those additional USMC forces which can be created -- over time -- through full/total mobilization. Accordingly, the more justifiable requirement for in-being, peacetime MAF headquarters is 1) readiness for worldwide contingencies short of general war and 2) coordination of a multitude of MAB/MAU requirements at the outset of general war. In these capacities, there is a clear need for three major, on-the-scene air/ground headquarters, so long as the division/wing/FSSG teams remain dispersed in three separate areas. While I MAF is justified in the minds of many as a planning headquarters, they would be the logical headquarters for a major PACOM amphibious requirement. The majority of prospective landing force elements are based close by, as is the source of amphibious shipping and Navy amphibious units. The alternative, employment of III MAF, would require deadheading amphibious ships to Hawaii and Japan for embarkation and subsequent rehearsal and movement to the objective area. WestPac areas for rehearsal landings of any size are exceedingly rare. Security in Japan during the planning and embarkation phases is problematic, as is obtaining host nation approval for launching an expeditionary effort from Japanese soil. The utility of the III MAF headquarters relates principally to non-amphibious introduction in Korea or elsewhere, the defense of Japan (a

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responsibility increasingly contested within the US government), and coordination with Seventh Fleet. Moreover, I and III MAF headquarters -- by virtue of the physical isolation of FMFPac headquarters -- are essential for proper coordination of amphibious embarkation and/or air movement of associated division/wing/FSSG elements in MAB or other formations, as well as arranging the requisite nondeploying support (e.g., departure airfield support, marshalling area security, communications, etc.). II MAF must be capable of amphibious or nonamphibious service and is part and parcel of the FMFLant headquarters, which will experience increased type command activity concurrent with deployment of its organic MAF command element. While national decisionmaking time, amphibious and merchant shipping assembly time, and execution planning time associated with the requirement to put 30 to 50 thousand Marines on foreign soil militate against the need to deploy a MAF headquarters instantaneously upon the recognition of a national crisis, the need for such a headquarters at the outset for planning and coordination is imperative. Peacetime training for the direction of such momentous efforts is also essential. Moreover, the full-time existence of the MAF headquarters demonstrates to both the unified commanders and the NCA the capability of the Fleet Marine Force to quickly muster and employ a sizable, comparatively self-contained, expeditionary combat capability. Therefore, peacetime existence of three MAF headquarters is fully justifiable for training and readiness for execution planning and subsequent deployment, either at the outset of hostilities or as a follow-on for an initial MAU/MAB commitment. The 4th Division/Wing Team neither represents sufficient resources to justify an in-being MAF command element, nor do current plans envision its commitment as a full division/wing team.

(b) MAB. The MAB is the operational workhorse of the Fleet Marine Force. Operations in the transition from peace to general war and unilateral expeditionary requirements will demand the initial commitment of MAB's, perhaps to be built up to MAF's as time progresses or shipping can be concentrated in one ocean or another. At the outset of general war, there could be more-or-less concomitant demands for MAB-size forces for the following areas: Iceland, Norway, Denmark/Schleswig-Holstein, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Azores, Cuba, Southwest Asia, Japan/Korea, and the Aleutians. Therefore, peacetime operational readiness clearly requires the availability of deployable, competently staffed, and well trained MAB headquarters elements for general war as well as for lesser demands. Not only does contingency responsiveness demand this; we must also exercise our alliance contribution annually in a fashion which instills confidence in our allies and sister Services and supports USMC claims on

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Defense readiness and modernization investments. MAB-level exercises are the best and most affordable vehicle. The last full-fledged division-wing exercise was STEELPIKE, held in 1964. The larger MAB exercises (BOLD GUARD, TEAM-WORK) take over a year to plan (mostly because of allied coordination/host nation support requirements) and once deployed, the participating MAB can be regionally fixated for as much as two months. Accompanying supply densities and task organizations may be totally unsuited to alternative commitment (especially amphibious assault) elsewhere or even in the same region, particularly if the force will not fit on the available shipping by virtue of pre-exercise administrative introduction of certain elements (e.g., aviation command and control) because of exercise time constraints. Therefore, there must be a backup MAB command element which can fill in for operational commitments (e.g., MPS, naval base defense, etc.) beyond the capability of the deployed MAGTF. With two MAB headquarters, the major exercises can be alternated permitting both command elements the opportunity to diversify their training programs. This applies principally to LANTCOM and WestPac. The pivotal role played by EastPac forces (PACOM, LANTCOM, EUCOM) at the outset of general war demands the availability of two MAB command elements. Additionally, six appropriately configured MAB headquarters provide the nuclei for expansion to upwards of six MAF headquarters, should such be required in total mobilization. The wartime expansion capability of the Marine Corps goes far beyond that reflected in full mobilization planning. Based on the foregoing, the operational requirement for two MAB headquarters per division/wing/FSSG base is entirely reasonable, although available resources -- as currently allocated -- will not support this. This will be addressed further in the paragraph on "Organizational Concepts." The requirement for a Reserve MAB headquarters must be justified on the basis of training and exercises rather than for contingency readiness.

(c) MAU. MAU's will be required not only for peacetime forward deployment but also for general war. During peacetime, they continue to be available for naval posturing in support of foreign policy, demonstrations, evacuations, raids, coup de main, and "spearhead" operations in preparation for follow-on MAB/MAF commitment. In general war, they will be required for amphibious raids and demonstrations. The current approach is to have two MAU headquarters available for "port-and-starboard" preparation and commitment to standing afloat deployment requirements. It works. Additionally, it provides a backup MAU command element to take commitments beyond the range or capability of the afloat deployed force. Depending upon the unified command arrangements and supporting force assignments adopted for SWA/IO, there may be a need to maintain three standing afloat MAU's (Med, IO, WestPac) with the capability to provide occasional deployments in the Caribbean. This not only stresses the rotary wing

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deployment capability but also MSSG and command element generation capabilities. This would probably require that each division/wing/FSSG base provide for one of the continuing afloat deployments, which in turn would end the unit deployment program currently in effect.

(6) In summary, then, there are solid requirements for maintenance of full time MAGTF headquarters; this should be recognized in both doctrine and organization. Each division/wing/FSSG base has need for a MAF and two MAB command elements; additionally, there is a requirement for four permanent MAU headquarters today which may grow to six. The following section will recommend the most effective and economic alternatives for meeting the requirements.

## d. Organizational Concept

(1) Maintenance of permanent MAGTF headquarters above and beyond extant structures may be considered by some as an unnecessary drain on combat power which is already degraded throughout the operating forces by FAP and non-T/O billets. However, to slight the military "brain" in favor of the limbs gives the illusion of military strength without the assurance of its success against a competent opponent. The price for skillful **operational** direction must be paid, either in additional structure or drawdowns against that which already exists. It is, however, an expense we are bearing now. The task at hand is to get the best capability at the least expenditure of resources. From the foregoing paragraphs, it can be seen that each division/wing/FSSG base should be capable of maintaining a MAF and two MAB headquarters in readiness for employment; additionally, FMFPac and FMFLant have requirements for two permanent MAU headquarters each.

(2) Readiness -- rapid deployment -- requires not only an in-being MAGTF staff to plan and conduct expeditionary operations and exercises but also an in-being structure to support its functioning during planning, embarkation, and operations in the objective area. The simple fact is that none of our major MAGTF headquarters possess in-being, ready-to-deploy headquarters and service elements. III MAF possesses a nucleus H&S Company with full T/E issue but requires significant personnel infusion and training for deployment. II MAF is dependent upon H&S Battalion, FMFLant which possesses equipment that has been farmed out to subordinate forces at Camp Lejeune for ostensible recovery in the face of a requirement to deploy but which lacks personnel or operating service sections for deployment in support of II MAF. I MAF has no headquarters and service support at all. None of the MAB headquarters have organic headquarters and service support. 4th MAB and 9th MAB headquarters are dependent upon the H&S Battalion

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and H&S Company of II and III MAF, respectively. The rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul approach may keep the tooth-to-tail ratio high, but it impedes the deployability of the MAGTF headquarters and, therefore, of the force as a whole. And it should be kept in mind that joint command relationships in the objective area may ultimately depend upon who can arrive first with a functioning command and control capability. The price of such readiness is dedicated -- and therefore increased -- staffing. The only question is how best to provide the requisite capabilities with the most efficient use of resources. The following options are organizational concepts for meeting operational requirements with ready, competent MAGTF command elements together with their headquarters support.

(3) OPTION 1 (Modular). A MAF command group is comprised of a family of modules (see picture below), using two MAB headquarters with H&S companies and a MAF planning headquarters as an organizational foundation. One of the MAB headquarters provides up to two MAU headquarters as required. These modules can be employed in various combinations.

(a) The MAF headquarters is represented by one planning group which is capable of planning for MAF-size operations and coordinating the activities of lesser, uncommitted MAGTF headquarters. It would not be capable of independent operations or have a T/E. It can be separately organized (e.g., I MAF) or it can be provided by an FMF headquarters (e.g., II MAF). For MAF-level commitments, the MAF planning module attaches to a MAB headquarters to provide a full-fledged MAF command capability.

(b) An operational MAB headquarters (MAF/MAB) is developed which is fully staffed together with an H&S Company that would permit the MAB headquarters to be autonomous. In addition to separate MAB-level operations, the MAB headquarters serves as the battle staff for the MAF commander upon amalgamation with the MAF planning cell.


(c) A second MAB headquarters (MAU/MAB) which is capable of participating in exercises, providing MAU headquarters for afloat deployments, and, in the absence of the first MAB headquarters, serving as the command nucleus for an operational requirement for a MAB or MAF providing it possessed two MAU headquarters. This MAB headquarters would be supported by a nucleus H&S company that would possess all of its T/E, the bulk of which would be preserved (e.g., the H&S Co., III MAF model) but only part of its personnel. The two MAU headquarters would, when combined with the MAB cell and H&S augmentation, form a headquarters similar in nature and capability to the operational MAB headquarters.

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## MAF COMMAND GROUP



(d) Employment Concept. While this concept features the fielding of MAF, MAB and MAU command elements, the greatest emphasis is placed on the MAB as an immediately employable element and as the battle staff for a MAF headquarters. Depending on the need, the MAF Planning Headquarters could be attached to the MAB headquarters at the outset or could be flown into an objective area to join a committed MAB headquarters for the purpose of converting a MAB operation into a MAF operation. The MAB commander becomes Chief of Staff of the MAF upon the arrival of the MAF commander. For MAB requirements, the operational MAB headquarters is augmented with specialist detachments (special communications, intelligence, etc.) and assigned major subordinate commands by the FMF commander in order to be capable of performing the operations listed in FMFM 0-1 for MABs. This headquarters, in addition to conducting exercises, would be prepared for all contingencies -- to include MPS. The second MAB (MAU/MAB) headquarters would orient primarily on the continuing requirement to provide afloat MAU headquarters, while retaining the capability to build the deployed MAU headquarters to MAB level or even to MAF level with attachment of the MAF Planning Headquarters. It, too, must be capable of planning and executing amphibious air movement, MPS, and administrative introduction.

### (e) Advantages

1 Emphasizes readiness of the command element (MAB) most likely required in the initial stages of either regional conflict or general war with provisions for simple escalation to MAF capability.

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2 Provides for improved expeditionary competence of both MAB and MAF headquarters by employing a battle staff which receives MAB and MAF level training in peacetime exercises.

3 Separates FMF/MAF planning from MAB planning/exercises/deployments, thereby providing for primary dedication of MAB and MAU headquarters to improving component-level execution planning and operational skills.

4 Provides command elements for the three MAGTF levels currently recognized in doctrine and plans.

5 Provides H&S company for each MAB potential MAF) headquarters for autonomous operations capability.

6 Provides better trained H&S support for MAF-level operations, as there are more peacetime opportunities for MAB exercises than for MAFs.

7 The afloat MAU headquarters functions additionally as the second MAB (forward) command element in those situations requiring buildup to MAB-level, facilitating planning, coordination, area orientation, and smooth transition. This is particularly advantageous for "composite MAF" build-up.

8 Permits FMFLant to meet its MAF responsibilities with the least disruption to the FMF type command functions necessary to recommend options for MAF employment, coordinate deployment, and arrange continuous logistic and personnel support. FMFPac is unaffected.

## (f) Disadvantages

1 Insufficient people in the nucleus H&S company to be responsive to requirements for immediate deployment of the second MAB (MAU/MAB) headquarters.

2 For MAF-level operations where the MAF is the senior headquarters in a joint or combined operation, the H&S company may require additional augmentation.

(4) OPTION 2 (Omnibus). This plan features an omnibus MAGTF headquarters (titled as MAF) with inclusive H&S Company for each DWT. This omnibus headquarters would be fully capable of planning and executing MAF-level operations as organized or lesser MAB and/or MAU level requirements with subunits of the headquarters and its H&S support. In this latter regard, it would be capable of subdivision into a MAF Planning Headquarters organized in much the same manner as in Option 1, a fully operational MAB command element, a MAB Planning Headquarters, two separate MAU headquarters,

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and an H&S Company capable of supporting a MAF or two MABs (H&S Company (-) and a subunit).

## OMNIBUS MAGTF HQ (MAF)

MAF PLANNING HQ	
MAB HQ	MAB PLANNING HQ
	MAU HQ
	MAU HQ

(OR)

MAF HQ
--------

H&S CO		
MAB HQ SUB UNIT	H&S CO (-)	M A U  D E T S

(a) Employment Concept. The emphasis in this option is upon the MAF headquarters. Its organization favors highest readiness for deployment and operations of a MAF command element which, in garrison, is also capable of providing for MAU and MAB commitments. It possesses all the component elements and capabilities of Option One organized into one, divisible omnibus unit.

### (b) Advantages

1 Provides for greater expeditionary competence of both MAB and MAF headquarters by employing a battle

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staff which receives both MAB and MAF level training in peacetime exercises.

2 Provides command elements for the three MAGTF levels currently recognized in doctrine and plans.

3 Affords a good basis for expeditionary escalation, e.g., reinforcing a forward deployed MAU headquarters to MAB level or MAB to MAF level.

4 Simplifies budgetary justification by focusing on one rather than a family of air-ground command elements for each division/wing/FSSG team.

## (c) Disadvantages


1 Possesses limited capability to field a second MAB command element.

2 Tends to blur the impact of staffing shortfalls by providing a means for short-term internal redistribution to meet day-to-day requirements, thereby creating internal turbulence and impeding the development of individual and team skills.

3 Obscures the distinction between FMF/MAF planning responsibilities and those of the MAB and MAU by amalgamation of all levels in one headquarters.

4 Forces FMFLant either to divest itself of its MAF responsibilities or absorb the functions of an entire omnibus MAGTF headquarters.

(5) OPTION 3 (Afloat MAB). This concept envisions a MAF Planning Headquarters (as in Option 1) with two separate MAB headquarters and supporting H&S companies, one of which would be forward deployed afloat in lieu of the MAU headquarters currently in use.



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(a) Employment Concept. The emphasis herein is on the MAB; MAU command elements are formed only when required and no longer are afloat forward deployed as a matter of course. The MAF headquarters comprises a planning element for MAF-level planning and for coordinating subordinate endeavors. To deploy it must be combined with a MAB headquarters which becomes the battle staff nucleus for the MAF commander. One of the MAB headquarters, supported by an H&S company with full T/E and limited staffing, would be afloat deployed with a BLT, aviation squadron, MSSG (or BSSG minus), and when required, the MPS/NTPS equipment and shipping. Since there would be no six-month turnover of the command element, afloat MAB tours would be one year unaccompanied assignments. Either MAB headquarters could be built to MAF level by addition of a MAF commander and the MAF planning cell.

(b) Advantages

1 Provides two readily available MAB headquarters -- one afloat and one ashore -- to implement the time-sensitive MPS concept and other plans/exercises.

2 Recognizes that while we deploy MAUs, we generally employ MABs.

3 Provides for rapid escalation to MAB or MAF command level since there would be no MAU headquarters to assimilate.

4 Separates MAF planning from MAB planning/exercises/deployments.

5 Provides better trained H&S support for MAF-level operations, as there are more peacetime opportunities for MAB exercises than for MAFs.

6 Provides H&S company for each MAB (potential MAF) headquarters.

7 Provides higher ranking landing force representation during USN-USMC planning evolutions by virtue of presence of afloat MAB headquarters.

8 Provides for greater expeditionary competence of both MAB and MAF headquarters by employing a battle staff which receives both MAB and MAF level training in peacetime exercises.

9 Permits FMFLant to meet its MAF responsibilities with the least disruption to the FMF type command functions necessary to recommend options for MAF employment, coordinate deployment, and arrange continuous logistic and personnel support. FMFPac is unaffected.

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10 Associates MPS more closely with afloat deployments.

## (c) Disadvantages

1 Requires full time afloat deployment of two Brigadier Generals as MAB commanders or day-to-day direction by a deputy with contingency assignment of a general officer during a developing crisis.

2 One year afloat tour provides little institutional memory for the afloat MAB headquarters.

3 Establishes a precedent for deploying MAB-level staffs on amphibians other than LCCs which limits the LF communications and spaces available afloat and support the contention that the MAB can get by with lesser facilities, further ceding the LCC to the exclusive use of the fleet commander.

4 Necessitates H&S augmentation for afloat MAB headquarters operations ashore.

5 Requires a change to MAGTF doctrine regarding the purpose and employment of MAUs.

6 Increases overseas unaccompanied billets.

7 Afloat MAB headquarters has little control over preparatory training and loading of BLTs, squadrons, and MSSGs (BSSGs) rotating into the afloat deployed force.

8 Separates afloat MAB headquarters from the bulk of the landing force and amphibious force during the planning and embarkation phases in those contingencies requiring a MAB amphibious assault drawing on additional forces in CONUS waters.

## (6) Comparison of the Options

(a) First, there are several advantages and disadvantages common to all options. On the plus side, all provide for more **readily** deployable, better trained MAB and MAF headquarters by employing the MAB staff, which actually participates in amphibious exercises, air movements, and field exercises either in its own right or as the operational battle staff of the MAF, should that level of command be required either at the outset or through escalation. Second, they all provide for more rapid and smoother transition to MAF level; in essence, all that is required is augmentation of either MAB headquarters with the MAF Planning Headquarters -- one plane load. On the other hand, all options will require

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reorganizing and reinforcing the communications battalion, FMF, although that may be indicated in any event.

(b) Second, there is the question of MAB versus MAF orientation. While all three are capable of providing either, Options One and Three emphasize the readiness and deployability of the MAB headquarters while Option Two focuses on a MAF capability. As mentioned earlier, general war and regional unilateral contingencies will demand the initial commitment of MABs, perhaps to be built up to MAFs as time progresses or shipping can be concentrated in one ocean or another. Several major OPLANs with MAF commitments notwithstanding, the initial general war commitment should be anticipated as largely MAB oriented, due to the large number of requirements, limitations in strategic mobility, and the short time available to execute the opening moves of the conflict. Larger MAF-level amphibious efforts come into their own in subsequent phases. The prospective pre-positioning of three MPS equipment sets further underscores the day-to-day requirement for capability to field MABs. Joint and combined exercises also require MAB-level participation; lift and cost constraints generally reduce MAF-level play to CPX's. On the other hand, the ability to concentrate Fleet Marine Forces from both Fleets for a MAF build-up demands the early availability of a MAF-level command element, and dealings with the other services in joint operations may also require the early development of a MAF headquarters. The planning load on MAF's, not only in the JOPS realm but also component-unique execution planning (i.e., the conduct of the operation through to a successful conclusion) is potentially heavy, depending on how much JOPS planning is done at the FMF level. Also, MAF-level coordination is desirable for deploying MABs and MAUs.

(c) Next is the issue of the utility of the MAU headquarters as a forward deployed command element; Option Three proposes substitution with an afloat deployed MAB headquarters. While this choice would increase forward-deployed staff power and clout, it would also increase the requirement for shipping space and afloat communications, as well as the number of unaccompanied tours. It would also increase operational opportunities for general officers, as two each year would be so assigned on a full time basis. MPS would become more closely associated with the afloat deployed forces, which would provide the headquarters and initial security for an MPS deployment. The actual air-movement can be executed by any headquarters -- either the component regiment or BSSG, for example. Option Three would limit FMF capabilities to generate MAUs by virtue of forward deployment of a large proportion of its MAGTF command resources. It also causes a major problem in planning for amphibious assault elements (the bulk of the MAB) and the USN amphibious forces which will have to come from CONUS.

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## (d) Manpower Considerations

1 The various options require approximately the same resources, since the functions supported are the same throughout. The major difference is how they are organized. Enclosures (2) through (6) provide illustrative T/O's for the modular approach (Option One) which is the most extended organizational option; Two and Three are essentially aggregations of Option One. It should be noted that these proposed tables of organization are constructed primarily from existing staffing approaches for each MAGTF headquarters level. The Advanced Amphibious Study Group is of the view that all operational headquarters could be reduced considerably in size with significant operational benefits accruing therefrom, both in operational direction, coordination, CP survivability, and reduction of communications nets, traffic, and signature. However, that issue is not part of this study. Using the manpower requirements of Option One as a base, enclosure (7) compares the manpower cost (manning level) of the current ad hoc approach with the manning level requirements for the stabilized proposals discussed herein. The net personnel increases in manning levels throughout the active structure to support the options are shown below in comparison to the cost of fielding three new MPS-type brigade headquarters. The MPS-type T/O requirements are based upon CG FMFPac's recommendation for 7th MAB's T/O (CG FMFPac ltr IMZ/pal over 5300 dtd 18 Aug 1981).

	<u>Option 1</u>	<u>3-MPS Bde HQ</u>
Marine officer	115	156
Marine enlisted	326	360
Navy officer	26	15
Navy enlisted	24	45

## 2 Methods for Meeting Staffing Shortfalls

a T/O Compensatory Reduction. There may be some T/O billets in the Marine Corps that can be reduced to provide spaces for a permanently structured MAGTF headquarters; however, previous attempts to find spaces (e.g., Force Structure Study) have by and large pumped that well dry. While many headquarters (e.g., division, wing) are overstaffed beyond T/O level, these assets are not affected by T/O reductions. As permanent MAGTF headquarters are phased in, T/O reduction in the Division-Wing-FSSG structure may be realized when, and if, it becomes apparent that the MAGTF staff is centralizing certain functions

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(e.g., special intelligence) of its major subordinate commands. MAGTF-Division-Wing-FSSG-FMF T/O compensatory reductions (where duplications exist) will be, at best, difficult to decide since no one HQMC Department has overall coordinating authority for MAGTF issues; e.g., DC/S PP&O has cognizance over ground structures while DC/S Aviation has responsibility for aviation structures.

b Manning Level Adjustment. The quickest method is by adjusting manning levels. Without T/O reduction or an increase in end strength, we could divert personnel from the DWT to fill MAGTF slots. This approach is being used for other headquarters. Here again, we may have approached the limits of utility of such "rob-Peter-to-pay-Paul" tactics. Still, it provides a temporary solution.

c Increase End Strength. The last and most satisfactory approach is to program T/O (and T/E) deficiencies over time to meet the needs of these commands. Two MAU headquarters (11/57 each) are programmed at this time for POM 82 and POM 83; three nucleus headquarters (17/26 each) for MPS-type brigades are programmed for FY 83, 85, and 87.

(e) UNITREP Considerations. The second H&S company in Options One and Three, due to its limited personnel staffing in peacetime, will need to be reported in the UNITREP system in a manner consistent with regulations and indicative of its capability, yet without prejudice to the MAB elements it is associated with in each concept. To accomplish this, there are four choices available:

1 Report as a cadre unit. As such the company would be registered with the system and would be reported as C-5 (Service programmed not combat ready).

2 Report as a nucleus unit. This unit would be registered with the JCS system also, but would not be given a readiness rating. Only the nucleus T/O would be reflected.

3 Report against the (full) T/O. This method, most commonly used, would produce a C-4 personnel readiness rating.

4 Register the unit without report. The registration would provide a data base which could accept information at a later date. The unit, however, would not be reported upon, and would be considered "inactive."

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## (7) Conclusions

(a) Option One affords the least disruption of existing doctrine and organizational approach while providing improved stability and operational utility by:

1 focusing on the MAB headquarters as the basis for expeditionary response, expansion to MAF, and provision of MAU headquarters.

2 employing a MAB battle staff -- trained in MAB exercises and MAF CPX's -- as the operational nucleus for both MAB and MAF contingencies.

3 simplifying escalation from MAU to MAB command -- essentially creating the MAU headquarters as the forward echelon of the MAB command element -- as well as from MAB to MAF.

4 maintaining the separation in garrison between MAF and MAB for purposes of planning and training management. The MAF planning cell provides planning continuity into the execution phase while insulating the MAB command elements from JOPS-level planning, which distracts it from developing component-level execution planning and battle skills.

5 retaining sizable flexibility among CONUS-based MAGTF command elements for forming MAGTFs of any size and for mounting point-to-point amphibious assaults.

## (b) Proposed MAGTF Distribution Within the Marine Corps<sup>1</sup>

<u>MAGTF COMPONENT</u>	<u>FMFLant</u>	<u>FMFPac (E)</u>	<u>FMFPac (W)</u>
MAF Planning HQ	II MAF	I MAF	III MAF
Operational MAB HQ	4th MAB	7th MAB	9th MAB
MAB Planning HQ	6th MAB	5th MAB <sup>2</sup>	1st MAB <sup>3</sup>
MAUs	32d MAU		31st MAU
	34th MAU		37th MAU

NOTES: 1. The proposed allocation is primarily based upon (1) the current geographical locations of extant MAGTF headquarters, (2) the evolution of those structures into the proposed distribution, and (3) a knowledge of current and probable employment plans (contingencies).

2. No current operational requirements for MAU headquarters.

3. 1st Marine Brigade redesignated 1st MAB.

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e. MAGTF Headquarters Competence. While there is a need to improve staff operational capabilities throughout the FMF, the competence of the MAGTF headquarters is absolutely essential. The MAGTF staff is key to successful planning and execution of the highly complex taskings -- amphibious warfare, joint and combined expeditionary service -- which are directly under the eye of the unified commander and the National Command Authority. Failures at this level affect the force as a whole as well as the mission toward which it is directed. In order for the Headquarters to function professionally in support of the commander, it must be staffed with the right kind of people who stay together long enough to develop the requisite individual and team skills. Like any other unit, a staff must be trained.

(1) Staffing. There are two aspects which deserve attention: who staffs the MAGTF headquarters with what for how long, and the regard with which such assignments are held within the officer corps.

(a) Heretofore, personnel assigned to MAGTF headquarters for duty (permanent and augmentation) have been so tasked in a variety of ways -- some by HQMC, some by an FMF or MAF headquarters (e.g., III MAF to 9th MAB) and others by division/wing/FSSG in response to a quota levied by a higher authority. The purpose of the organizational concepts discussed previously is to stabilize the key and most deployable elements and billets. While some augmentation will be required (e.g., for deployment/employment of the second MAB headquarters and its H&S support), the primary team members are intended to be permanently assigned and should be so directed by HQMC where backgrounds and training can be matched to the assignment. This ensures that other headquarters requirements do not filter off talent which is required by the command elements ultimately responsible for operational direction of the committed Marine force as well as its naval/joint/combined interface with adjacent and higher commands. Moreover, HQMC has a larger manpower pool from which to draw than does the FMF headquarters. Permanently assigned officers must be top-notch, among the best the Marine Corps can bring to bear. Augmentation is and can be best handled at the FMF (MAF in PACOM) level; the proposals herein reduce the magnitude of the requirement, however.

(b) Tour length for MAGTF staff officers must be sufficiently long to develop individual and team skills while preserving, to the degree possible, as much institutional memory as possible. Those assigned to PCS duty with MAF and MAB headquarters should be assigned for at least two year tours -- three if possible. Consideration could be given to extending "sea duty" status to these assignments -- regardless of location -- to underscore the

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expeditionary nature of all such billets, yet permitting movement of the family to the "homeport," e.g., Okinawa, while accruing an overseas control date.

(c) Assignment to duty with a MAGTF headquarters has not always been viewed with the enthusiasm that assignment to the division and wing generally inspires. Part of this is due to the opportunity for reassignment within the wing or division to a command tour (or flying billet) after having paid one's dues as a staff officer. Clearly, that prospect is unavailable upon assignment to a MAGTF headquarters, and if a MAGTF headquarters tour is to count as an "FMF tour," thereby abrogating subsequent assignment to a tactical unit, such duty will not be eagerly sought. Emphasis from the top can influence this -- CMC "white letters" and views expressed at schools (AWS, C&SC, etc.), career planners and monitor advice are ways -- but words of themselves will have only passing effect. If the operational direction exercised by the MAGTF commander is of concern and if its quality is based on competent staff support, that point must be conveyed to the officer corps by means of tangible demonstration. Certainly an initial step is the continuing assignment of high quality officers to the key MAGTF staff assignments -- C/S, G-3, G-4, and G-5 among others. Word gets around fast in an organization as small as the Marine Corps. Next, these officers should not be denied subsequent opportunities to serve in the division/wing/FSSG by dint of such MAGTF duty. Establishment of MAGTF duty as a prerequisite for selection to top level school or as an alternative to joint duty (most MAU/MAB/MAF assignments involve considerable joint and combined interaction) are examples of professional enticements which could be employed to strengthen the desirability of such an assignment. The "sea duty" provision mentioned earlier is another option. However, the enticements proffered should underscore the professional challenge and rewards of such assignment rather than appear to offer recompense for suffering well in an undesirable billet.

(2) Training. There are both individual and team skills which must be developed for proper staff functioning. The individual skills can be acquired in professional military education and specialist schools (embarkation, NBC) either prior to or during the course of assignment to the MAGTF headquarters. However, the team skills can be developed only with the staff as a whole, although this can be facilitated by teaching and enforcement of standardized staff procedures and documentation throughout the FMF. The responsibility for training the staff as a unit to support the commander rests with the Chief of Staff/Executive Officer -- a responsibility which is conspicuously absent in the listing of his functions in FMFM 3-1. Only he can match the coordinated capabilities of the staff as a whole to the commander's requirements for support, which will vary from individual to



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individual. The day-to-day flow of staff work which develops fundamental relationships and team coordination also distracts the staff from developing operational warfighting skills. Implicit in the mission performance standards for MAGTF headquarters contained in MCCRES VOL VII are the fundamental command and staff skills -- team skills --- which underlie any military decision: the sequence of command and staff action embodying mission analysis, estimates, operational and logistic concept development, plan/order development, and staff supervision of execution of those concepts. Following development of the basic skills of how to think as a corporate body, the staff should be exercised in the various operational problems which may confront them: amphibious assault, air movement, "triphibious" operations as well as offense, defense, and delay in various geographic circumstances to include river lines and built up areas. Like any other unit, a staff should develop and follow an annual training plan. Exclusive dependence upon CPXs and scheduled exercises limits the extent and variety of staff operational training which can be performed. There are other vehicles available, some of which have been used in other nations for hundreds of years. While day-to-day requirements will always interfere with staff training, the MAGTF headquarters represents the best opportunity we have for breaking out of the bonds of "business-as-usual" to develop operational staff skills. The division/wing/FSSG headquarters have become immersed in managing the various administrative responsibilities which have burgeoned since WW II, thereby seriously impeding their own operational development.

(a) The options for staff training include locally instituted and conducted training and exercises conducted by an external organization (e.g., higher headquarters, MCDEC, LFTC). MCCRES evaluation of MAGTF headquarters is undeniably useful; however, it should be employed to measure training, not to substitute for it. Local exercises are less costly and easier to schedule than "imported" training; however, the "import" approach provides better instruction and frees the receiving unit from the preparatory investment of time and effort. Probably some combination of the two should be sought.

(b) Local training can take the form of classes, demonstrations, and exercises, this latter to include model exercises, war games and exercises without troops as well as the more familiar CPXs and field exercises. Probably one of the simplest and most direct training methods is CS/XO insistence on employment of doctrinal staff techniques and documentation in day-to-day business. A continuing commander-staff dialogue embodying initial information briefings, mission analysis, commander's guidance, staff estimates, and development of plausible courses of action for ultimate command



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decision is a problem-solving approach which has broad applicability. Unfortunately, it is seldom employed. The estimate process need not be elaborate and in most cases not even written; however, if staff officers are to provide objective advice, they must master and employ this basic skill. Mission analysis and development of alternative courses of action are other techniques which have fallen into disuse; alternatives when offered, are frequently designed to complement a favored course of action rather than to provide equally feasible, acceptable, and suitable options for balanced comparison. Throughout, the goal must be to train the staff how to think as a corporate body, how to react to surprise and a changing situation, and how to identify problems and recommend solutions for command decision. Training in how to think must precede instruction in what to think about. Either from local resources or from extension support provided by MCDEC, the MAGTF headquarters should manage this task locally and MCCRES should provide for evaluation of these fundamental skills. This is the only way that homogeneity of staff functioning across the FMF can be obtained -- an essential ingredient for composite MAB/MAF evolutions drawing MAGTFs from both fleets. What to think about -- amphibious operations, air movement, MPS planning, raid planning, combat in built up areas, etc. -- can be addressed by both local and "import" training.

(c) Improved training of an amphibious nature can and has been conducted by the LFTCs; if this were to be increased, the resources -- money and perhaps additional staffing -- would have to be made available. The LFTCs are not oriented toward non-amphibious instruction and it would be difficult to expand their charter, as they are a subordinate element of the Fleet Surface Force with only administrative and doctrinal linkage to the Marine Corps. On the other hand, MCDEC is part of the USMC supporting establishment, fully responsive to CMC direction. Its educational function (MCDECO P5400.4C),

"To educate officers in the principles, doctrine, tactics and techniques of warfare, with particular emphasis on the landing force aspects of amphibious operations, in order to provide commanders and staff officers for the air-ground forces of the Marine Corps, and to conduct such other schools and functions as directed by CMC."

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would appear consistent with the requirement, although its methodology would require expansion beyond the resident instruction approach to include the operation of mobile training teams in support of the FMF -- specifically the MAGTF headquarters and perhaps others as well. Not only does this put the instruction precisely at the point where it will most directly influence the effectiveness of the air-ground forces it is intended to support, but also it will offset, to some degree, the fact that many of the officers assigned to such duty do not have the advantage of advanced formal military education. Again, the question of resources arises. The current tempo of resident instruction and staffing limitations preclude any major extension program at present. However, if additional resources cannot be made available, consideration could be given to reapportionment of functions and personnel within MCDEC. For example, the Amphibious Warfare Presentation Team, tasked (MCDECO P5400.4C)

"To prepare and present amphibious warfare studies to illustrate the amphibious doctrine, tactics and techniques of the United States Marine Corps in projecting seapower ashore against a target held by hostile forces."

could be reoriented toward "circuit rider" training within the Fleet Marine Force. This would constitute a reversion to the original focus of this effort (1932-1940), which was internal doctrinal development and promulgation. While such a shift would cut back on a useful means of explaining the strategic utility of amphibious capabilities outside the Marine Corps, it can be argued that the performance of our MAGTF's in joint and combined exercises and in actual expeditionary service stands as more convincing testimony to our ultimate strategic value. An additional advantage is the operational feedback available to MCDEC for updating and revising their resident instruction. In the area of amphibious planning, the LFTC mobile training capabilities could be put to good use in augmentation of an overall effort developed and coordinated by MCDEC.

## (d) Staff Exercises

1 As a general rule, the more elaborate an exercise, the less frequently it will be conducted. Investment in preparation requires time and planning staff, both of which are finite in any command. High investment training evolutions inevitably conflict with other commitments and accordingly should be limited. There are a variety of techniques used in Europe for the conduct of training by commanders and staffs which do not require the deployment of

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troops. These techniques were necessitated by the need in peacetime to exercise without available maneuver areas (until after the fall harvests) and in war to exercise commanders and their staffs without disrupting troop dispositions and to promulgate new tactical concepts. The British and Commonwealth nations refer to these as model exercises (sand tables, etc.) and tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs); all these approaches were derived from the übungsreisen (staff rides) and Kriegspiel (war games) developed by Prussia during the 19th century. Not only do they serve as a means for developing command and staff opportunities for military problem-solving -- mission analysis, estimates, development of operational and logistic concepts -- but also they provide a means for considering tactical problems for which no maneuver area exists.

2 For example, consider combat in built up areas. While a regiment could not expect to conduct field exercises in a major urban area, a regimental commander and his battalion commanders can easily and unobtrusively conduct a TEWT in any city -- even in a foreign country. There is another plus; the command element is provided the opportunity to exercise its decisionmaking capabilities before dragging the troops through a full-fledged field exercise. The model exercise and wargame also provide a means for rehearsal of certain tactical evolutions as well as examining new concepts before employing them in the field.

3 The TEWT and model exercise are the simplest techniques and require the least preparatory investment. The terrain model for the model exercise can be anything from a crumpled blanket on a ship's wardroom table to a child's sandbox to a fully-developed map-related terrain mockup such as those employed at Little Creek and Quantico. These latter can be produced as portable facilities either for use in local training or as an aid for training conducted by a mobile training team. In this latter regard, an amphibious planning exercise for both landing force and amphibious force staffs can be conducted in a model exercise under LFTC/Amphibious School tutelage, entirely without supporting communications or maneuver units. The TEWT and model exercise can be developed for the force as a whole or to focus on ground warfare, the air battle, or combat service support.

4 The wargame, either manual or computer-assisted, is a more elaborate exercise; TWSEAS provides yet another training capability. These more sophisticated exercises are probably best conducted as import training sponsored by MCDEC. CPXs and full field exercises are logical follow-ons once the basic skills have been mastered by the command element.

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5 Recognizing that full field/amphibious exercises for MABs and MAFs are infrequent, high-visibility and generally joint and/or combined in nature, formal evaluation of the larger MAGTF headquarters during operations afield will seldom occur. The model exercises and wargame provide a more economical means of testing the ability of a MAGTF command element to think and solve military problems as a corporate entity. There is no reason why such an approach could not be adopted for MCCRES evaluation of MAB/MAF headquarters, as well as division, wing, and FSSG headquarters -- after completing an appropriate headquarters training program.

### 3. RECOMMENDATIONS


a. Accept into doctrine and permanent active force structure one MAF and two MAB headquarters for each division/wing/FSSG base; among other things, this will require converting 1st Marine Brigade into 1st MAB. Additionally, maintain two full time MAU headquarters each in FMFPac and FMFLant.

<u>MAGTF COMPONENT</u>	<u>FMFLant</u>	<u>FMFPac (E)</u>	<u>FMFPac (W)</u>
MAF Planning HQ	II MAF	I MAF	III MAF
Operational MAB HQ	4th MAB	7th MAB	9th MAB
MAB Planning HQ	6th MAB	5th MAB	1st MAB
MAU HQ	32d MAU		31st MAU
	34th MAU		37th MAU

b. Organize the MAGTF headquarters in accordance with the modular option (option one) wherein two MAB headquarters, complete with their own H&S companies, are available for commitment either as a MAB or as the battle staff of a MAF headquarters upon amalgamation with the MAF Planning Headquarters and a MAF commander. One MAB headquarters is maintained at full strength while the second is manned at reduced strength. The MAB planning headquarters serves as the deployment base for the two rotating MAU headquarters. It is capable of assimilating its MAU Headquarters, forming a full MAB headquarters. To be autonomous, its H&S Company would require augmentation to give it a T/O identical to that of the H&S Company supporting the Operational MAB Headquarters.

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c. Implement the concept by phases, as proposed in the implementing plan (enclosure (8)).

d. Organize the communication battalion, FMF to support two independently deployed MAB Headquarters, one MAF Headquarters, or one MAF/MAB Headquarters and two MAU Headquarters, providing special capabilities (WWMCCS interface, satellite communications) for any one of the MAGTF Headquarters contained in the recommended option.

e. Apace with the development of permanent MAGTF headquarters, built to two full strength ANGLICOs (organized for the revised mission currently being tested) in the active structure to improve MAGTF headquarters joint and combined interoperability/mutual supportability.

f. Develop appropriate doctrine for employment of MPS; subsequently, require that all MAB headquarters be capable of planning and executing MPS operations in time for introduction of the three sets of MPS equipment forthcoming.

g. Continue to manage MAGTF headquarters permanent personnel staffing from HQMC.

h. Provide incentives for MAGTF staff duty, such as:

- Alternative to joint duty
- Subsequent reassignment to division/wing/FSSG if desired.

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i. Develop, in coordination with MCDEC and the LFTCs, a MAGTF headquarters training program which will create the fundamental command and staff skills necessary to solve anticipated and unanticipated military problems, using both local training and mobile training teams and focusing on low investment exercises (model exercises, TEWTs, wargames).

j. Employ standardized staff techniques and documentation in day-to-day business throughout the operating forces.

k. Assign DC/S, PP&O as the MAGTF sponsor for the purpose of conducting the implementation plan contained at enclosure (8) to this study, and for determining future adjustments to MAGTF headquarters T/O's, T/E's, and other related requirements.

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## MAGTF HEADQUARTERS COMMUNICATIONS AND LIAISON REQUIREMENTS

1. PROBLEM. To provide communications and liaison capabilities adequate to meet the Marine Corps-wide requirements for MAF and MAB command elements.

### 2. DISCUSSION

a. In addition to the aforementioned doctrinal and organizational problems, USMC command and control capabilities are limited by communications deficiencies. Equipment and organizational shortfalls have dictated a continuing pattern of drawdown and redistribution of division, wing, and FSSG equipment and operators to meet MAGTF headquarters deployment and exercise requirements. On the amphibious side, shipboard communications for the landing force commander -- the LCC -- may be diverted at the hour of greatest need by the Fleet commander for his own requirements, placing an even higher premium for early establishment of MAGTF command and control ashore. In non-amphibious operations, shipboard communications may be totally unavailable, requiring that the MAGTF commander provide his own long-haul communications for operational direction links with the theater commander and/or the NCA as well as for administrative and logistic support from CONUS. Commitment to joint and combined exercises further aggravates the problem, as the MAGTF is obliged to provide communication and encryption assets for liaison with adjacent and subordinate allied/sister Service forces. The problem is not limited to peacetime exercises; current contingency plans reflect MAGTF force obligations worldwide which may require association with allied and/or US Army forces from battalion to corps level. In the context of "rapid deployment," the MAGTF may be obliged to provide interim joint command and control pending arrival of a larger joint continental capability (e.g., JTF, subordinate unified command headquarters). Regardless of the type of operation, special intelligence-related communications will be required beyond current capabilities. All of these factors underscore the requirement to expand MAB and MAF command communications capabilities.

b. Resources available to support MAGTF command element communications needs include:

(1) The Communications Battalion, FMF, which is the primary source of internal and external communications support for the MAGTF headquarters.

(2) The Radio Battalion, FMF for special intelligence communications, among other things.

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(3) ANGLICO, FMF for joint and combined supporting arms control and liaison.

(4) Drawdown of organic Division, Wing, and FSSG communications organizations (with concomitant degradation of their capabilities to command).

(5) JCSE support as available and assigned, in accordance with JCS direction.

c. Communication organizational problems most likely to hinder MAF/MAB operations include:

(1) Inability to provide communications support simultaneously for two MAB command elements with the current communications battalion organization and resources.

(2) Necessity to be able to function within a joint or combined force -- perhaps even as joint/combined force command element -- notwithstanding limited communications and liaison resources.

d. Two MAB Headquarters Requirement

(1) As discussed in the basic study, there is a need within each division/wing/FSSG base for two MAB headquarters during peacetime for training, planning, and responding to operational requirements. Yet there is only one Communications Battalion, FMF available for each, and it is oriented toward supporting a MAF headquarters. Since the communications requirements for a MAB headquarters are almost the same as those for the MAF, more equipment and a more responsive Communications Battalion organization are indicated.


(2) One solution, among several, organizes the Communications Battalion to reconfigure Communications Company and Communications Support Company to provide two mirror image letter companies. The Long Lines Company would be eliminated and its multi-channel assets would be split between the two new letter companies; its long haul communications equipment would move to the Headquarters Company for attachment to either of the two letter companies supporting a MAB. The proposed reorganization would configure the Communication Battalion as follows:

(a) The Battalion would be composed of 3 companies: A Company, B Company, and Headquarters Company.

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


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(b) Companies A and B are configured specifically to support one Marine Amphibious Brigade each. They would have identical T/O's and T/E's. They would most closely resemble the configuration of the present day Communication Company, Communication Battalion. The personnel and equipment assets would come from the present Communication Company and Communication Support Company. These assets would basically be pooled and split down the middle. In addition, multi-channel equipment (AN/MRC-135's) would be taken from the present Long Lines Company and divided between Companies A and B.

(c) A and B Companies would then be configured as follows:




(d) The remaining company, Headquarters Company, would be organized to give additional support on an as-required basis to Companies A and B. Resident in Headquarters Company would be those bulky, low density items that require specialized maintenance and operation; i.e., TCC-38, TYC-5A, TGC-37, TRC-97. This equipment would be available and on-call for specially needed augmentation, especially for long-haul circuit requirements, or for sustained operation in a more static environment. These items would reside in Communication Support Platoon, Headquarters Company.

(e) The present Construction Platoon, Long Lines Company, would be moved into Headquarters Company.

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(f) Other functional areas such as engineer, motor transport, supply, electronic maintenance, and admin would be organized by platoon in Headquarters Company.



(g) Ideally, each letter company would be expanded to the level where it could support a MAB without augmentation (other than the long-haul detachment from Headquarters Company). Also, the expanded organization could support the deployment of a MAF command element without extensive drawdowns on division/wing/FSSG assets for joint and combined command liaison to subordinate, adjacent, and higher headquarters, as is currently required. If the reorganized companies are not expanded, deployment of one in support of a MAB will require reinforcements from the other. Still, the remaining company (albeit reduced in capability) would provide organizational focus and dedicated communication planning capabilities for subsequent deployment of the second MAB headquarters, using division/wing/FSSG augmentation or mobilized 4th DWT resources. For MAF operations, the battalion can be deployed as a whole.

e. Joint/Combined Requirements. MAGTFs are required increasingly to participate in joint and combined exercises and operations. The joint nature of JCS decisionmaking and US participation in various collective security arrangements point to the high probability that this is an irreversible trend. The NATO, SWA, and Korean contingency plans are salient examples, as are the major exercises in which MAGTFs participate. Indeed, the functional responsibilities of the Fleet Marine Force at the juncture of naval and continental warfare and the inclusive dimension of the air battle demand that the MAGTF be capable of interoperations with all US Services as well as those of our allies.

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(1) There are two FMF organizations which provide support for MAGTF headquarters joint/combined linkage requirements -- the communications battalion and ANGLICO. The communications support company, communications battalion is functionally responsible for providing communications teams and equipment for command-level linkage with subordinate and adjacent allied or sister Service headquarters. However, none of the three communications battalions in the FMF are organized the same. While FMFLant's assets are close to the doctrinal mark, FMFPac's capabilities are dispersed. Communications Support Company, 7th Comm Bn is located in Hawaii, while the MAGTF headquarters it would reasonably expect to support are in Japan. Ninth Comm Bn assets are split between Camp Pendleton and Twentynine Palms. In both the FMFPac cases, Comm Supt Company functional responsibilities have evolved to something quite different than originally intended. The reorganization for communications battalion proposed herein would ensure the balanced availability of internal and external communications to both III MAF and 9th MAB in Japan, 1st MAB (if so reconfigured/redesignated) in Hawaii, 7th MAB at Twentynine Palms, and I MAF/5th MAB (if created) at Camp Pendleton, as well as the advantages of organizational consistency throughout the operating forces.

(2) The Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies were originally organized as the USN/USMC contribution to support the Army's amphibious responsibilities; however, as the Army has withdrawn from active amphibious participation, ANGLICO has evolved into a means for the MAF/MAB/MAU commander to ensure the interoperability and mutual supportability of the MAGTF with adjacent allied or Army forces in combined and joint operations. MAGTF commanders participating in joint/combined operations frequently become the joint/combined commander because of the size of the force they bring to the objective area. In this capacity, MAGTF commanders are frequently required to offset combat power deficiencies in allied components with air, artillery and NGF. This requires attachment of ANGLICO elements both for planning, controlling and coordinating such fires and as a political demonstration of good faith (e.g., ROKMC Bde in RVN). These elements are employed not only for air/NGF but also for command liaison during the initial phases of assault and occasionally for secure voice communications with allies. Furthermore, the presence of USMC air liaison infrastructure with adjacent allied/US units tends to defuze conflicts concerning employment and control of USMC aviation. So long as the MAGTF provides the wherewithal to offer, provide, and control USMC excess sorties on a daily basis to adjacent forces, there can be little complaint about Marine ability to respond to joint or combined aviation

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requirements. Currently, FMFLant is conducting a test of a proposed modification to the ANGLICO mission, T/O, and T/E which accommodates these requirements. If successful, the modifications will expand the MAGTF commander's joint and combined communications and liaison linkage capabilities with no increase required in end-strength. While the need for ANGLICO support is a function of the size of the allied/Army force operating alongside rather than the size of the MAGTF involved, a good rule of thumb is an ANGLICO brigade platoon for each MAB headquarters for a total of six -- two full strength companies. At present, the active FMF possesses one ANGLICO (two-thirds with FMFLant, one-third with FMFPac) with another in the reserve structure.

(3) Should the MAGTF headquarters be obliged to function additionally as a joint task force command element, it will require augmentation in both communication and liaison capabilities to meet the obligation which a senior headquarters incurs for providing linkage to its subordinate components. The joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) maintained by REDCOM for employment with the RDJTF or other joint force commands designated by the JCS is over-committed and insufficient to meet the many requirements for its services. While the JCSE should be capable of supporting a regionally limited requirement, its availability during a global crisis is questionable. In this latter case, however, events worldwide and the necessity to deal with them will quickly overload WWMCCS and the attention of the National Command Authority, thereby forcing decentralized theater execution of broad national direction. This in itself will ease the requirement for JTF joint communication support. Accordingly, whether in limited conflict (supportable by the JCSE) or global (intratheater comm only), there appears to be little justification for acquiring an organic JCSE capability in the Marine Corps -- which is just as well, considering the resources involved. On the other hand, the communications battalion must be prepared for expansion by attachment of other USMC resources and JCSE or Army elements to meet the need of JTF command.

### 3. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That the communications battalion be organized to provide support simultaneously to two MAB headquarters or one MAF headquarters.

b. That pending such final reorganization, the concept be tested in the FMF in accordance with the schedule reflected in Enclosure (8).

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c. That, apace with the development of permanent MAGTF headquarters proposed in the basic study, the Marine Corps build to two full strength ANGLICO's in the active structure to improve MAGTF headquarters joint and combined interoperability/mutual supportability.

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## MAF HEADQUARTERS<sup>1,2,3</sup>

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
1	Command	Commanding General	MajGen	9903	I		MAF-1
2		Aide-de-Camp	Capt	9910	I		MAF-2
3		Sergeant Major	SgtMaj	9999	I		MAB-124; MAU 1-3
4		Food Tech Spec	GySgt	3372	I		Contingency billet
5		Food Tech Spec	SSgt	3372	I		Contingency billet
6		Driver	Cpl	3535	I		MAF-3
7	Chief of Staff	Chief of Staff	BGen	9903	I		MAF-4; MAB-1 as required
8		Dep C/S (Plans)	Col	9906	I		MAF-7
9		Dep C/S (Opns)	Col	9907	I		MAB-4
10		Staff Sec	LtCol	9910	I		MAF-8
11		Asst Staff Sec	Maj	9910	I		MAB-5
12		Protocol O	Lt	9910	I		MAF-5; MAB-2
13		Admin Chief	GySgt	0193	I		MAF-9
14		Admin Clerk	SSgt	0151	I		MAB-6
15		Admin Clerk/Driver	Sgt	0151	I		MAF-10
16		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAB-7
17		Driver	Cpl	3535	I		MAF-6; MAB-3
18	G-1	AC/S G-1	Col	9907	I		MAF-11
19		Asst G-1	LtCol	9910	I		MAB-8; MAU 2-2
20		Asst G-1 (Opns)	Maj	9910	I		MAB-9
21		Asst G-1 (Plans)	Maj	9910	I		MAF-12
22		Personnel Chief	MSgt	0193	I		MAF-13
23		Admin Chief (Opns)	GySgt	0193	I		MAB-10; MAU 1-5
24		Admin Chief (Plans)	SSgt	0193	I		MAB-11; MAU 2-5
25		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAB-12
26		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAF-18
27	G-2 Executive Unit	AC/S G-2	Col	9906	I		MAF-24
28		Asst G-2	LtCol	0205	I		MAF-25
29		Asst G-2 (Ln0)	Maj	0202	I		MAB-21; MAU 1-8
30		Intel Chief	MGySgt	0291	I		MAF-27
31		Asst Intel Chief	MSgt	0291	I		MAB-14
32		Library/MC&G Chief	GySgt	0231	I		MAF-33
33		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	I		MAB-15
34		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAF-28
35		Admin Clerk	LCpl	0151	I		MAF-29
36		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	I		MAB-16

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<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
37	<u>Combat</u>	Cmbt Intel O	LtCol	0202	1		MAB-13
38	<u>Intel</u>	Ground OB O	Maj	0202	1		MAB-17; MAU 2-8
39	<u>Unit</u>	Asst Ground OB O	Capt	0202	1		MAB-18; MAU 1-9 Add MOS 0205/9960
40		Ground OB Analyst	GySgt	0231	1		MAB-19; MAU 2-10
41		Ground OB Analyst	SSgt	0231	1		MAF-36
42		Intel Specialist	Cpl	0231	1		MAB-20; MAU 1-12
43		Air OB O	Maj	0202	1		MAF-30
44		Asst Air OB O	Capt	0202	1		MAB-22; MAU 2-9; Add MOS 0205/9960
45		Air OB Analyst	GySgt	0231	1		MAB-23; MAU 1-10
46		Air OB Analyst	SSgt	0231	1		MAF-36
47		Intel Specialist	Cpl	0231	1		MAB-24; MAU 2-12
48		Tgt Intel O	Maj	0202	1		MAF-34
49		Asst Tgt Intel O	Capt	0202	1		MAB-25
50		Tgt Analyst	GySgt	0231	1		MAB-26
51		Photo II Chief	MSgt	0241	1		MAF-31
52		Photo II	GySgt	0241	1		MAB-27
53		Photo II	SSgt	0241	1		MAB-28; MAU 1-11
54		Photo II	Sgt	0241	1		MAB-29; MAU 2-11
55		Combat Intel Chief	MSgt	0231	1		MAF-35
56		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		MAB-30; MAU 1-13
57		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		MAB-31; MAU 2-13
58	<u>Special</u>	SSO/SIO	Maj	2602	1		MAF-26
59	<u>Intel</u>	Asst SSO/SIO	Capt	2602	1		MAB-32
60	<u>Unit</u>	SS Comm Chief	Sgt	2651	1		MAB-33
61		Intel Comm Oper	Cpl	2651	3		MAB-34
62	<u>Counter</u>	Staff CI O	Capt	0210	1		MAB-35
63	<u>Intel</u>	Staff CI Chief	MSgt	0211	1		MAF-37
64	<u>Unit</u>	CI Specialist	SSgt	0211	1		MAB-36
65		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		MAB-37
66	G-3	AC/S G-3	Col	9906	1		MAF-38
67	<u>Executive</u>	Opns Chief	MGySgt	8711	1		MAF-39
68	<u>Unit</u>	Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	1		MAF-51
69		Admin Clerk	LCpl	0151	2		MAF-54
70		Liaison O	LtCol	9910	1		MAF-46
71		Asst Liaison O	Maj	0802	1		MAF-47

# MARDIS

# MARDIS

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
72	<u>Operations Unit</u>	Asst G-3 (Opns)	Col	9906	I		MAB-38; MAU 1-1
73		Asst Opns (G)	LtCol	0302	I		MAB-48; MAU 1-14
74		Asst Opns (A)	LtCol	9912	I		MAB-39; MAU 2-14
75		Opns Chief	MGySgt	8711	I		MAB-40
76		Asst Opns Chief	SSgt	0369	I		MAB-49; MAU 1-49
77		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	I		MAB-42
78		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAB-43
79		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	I		MAB-44; MAU 1-20
80		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	I		MAB-45; MAU 2-20
81		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	I		MAB-46
82		Draftsman	Cpl	1411	I		MAB-47
83		Air O	Maj	9912	I		MAB-50; MAU 1-15
84		Asst Air O	Capt	9912	I		MAB-51; MAU 2-15
85		Opns Man	Cpl	7041	I		MAB-52; MAU 1-19
86		Opns Man	Cpl	7041	I		MAB-53; MAU 2-19
87		NGF O	LCdr	1100		I	MAB-54
88		Arty O/WEO	Maj	0802	I		MAB-55; MAU 1-17
89		Asst Arty O/WEO	Capt	0802	I		MAB-56; MAU 2-17
90		Opns Asst/NBC	SSgt	0848	I		MAB-57; MAU 1-18; Add MOS 5711
91		Opns Asst/NBC	SSgt	0848	I		MAB-58; MAU 2-18; Add MOS 5711
92		EWO	Capt	2602	I		MAB-59
93	<u>Plans Unit</u>	Asst G-3 (Plans)	Col	9907	I		MAF-40
94		Asst Plans O (G)	LtCol	9911	I		MAF-41
95		Asst Plans O (A)	LtCol	9912	I		MAF-42
96		Air O	Maj	9912	I		MAF-48
97		Opns Chief	MSgt	8711	I		MAB-41
98		Asst Opns Chief	SSgt	0369	I		MAB-60; MAU 2-49
99		Admin Chief	SSgt		I		MAF-50
100		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	2		MAF-52
101		Admin Clerk	LCpl	0151	I		MAF-54
102		Draftsman	Cpl	1411	I		MAF-53
103		JOPS O	Maj		I		MAF-44
104		JOPS/TPFDO/WMCCS	Sgt		I		MAF-45
105		WEO	Maj	9911	I		MAF-43
106		EWO	Maj	2602	I		MAF-49

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# MARDIS

<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
107	G-4	AC/S G-4	Col	9906	1		MAF-55
108	<u>Executive</u>	Dep AC/S G-4	Col	9907	1		MAB-61; MAU 2-1
109	<u>Unit</u>	Opns O	LtCol	0402	1		MAF-56
110		Asst Opns O	Maj	0402	1		MAB-64; MAU 1-21
111		Asst Opns O	Capt	0402	1		MAF-59
112		Log Opns Chief	MGySgt	0491	1		MAB-62
113		Asst Log Opns Chief	GySgt	0491	1		MAB-65; MAU 1-23
114		Log Clerk	Sgt	0441	1		MAF-68
115		Log Clerk	Cpl	0491	2		MAB-66; MAU 1-26
116		Admin Clerk/Driver	Cpl	0151	1		MAF-69
117		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		MAB-63
118		Plans O	LtCol	0402	1		MAF-58
119		Asst Plans O	Maj	0402	1		MAB-67; MAU 2-21
120		Log Plans Chief	MGySgt	0491	1		MAF-57
121		Asst Log Plans Chief	GySgt	0491	1		MAB-68
122		Log Clerk	Cpl	0491	2		MAB-69; MAU 2-26
123		Admin Clerk/Driver	Cpl	0151	1		MAF-69
124		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		MAB-63
125		Liaison O	LtCol	3060	1		MAF-62
126		Asst Liaison O	Maj	2102	1		MAF-63
127	<u>Supply</u>	Supply O	LtCol	3002	1		MAF-60
128		Asst Supply O	Maj	3002	1		MAB-70
129		Gnd Sup O	Capt	3002	1		MAB-71
130		Av Sup O	Capt	3060	1		MAB-72
131		Sup Chief	MSgt	3043	1		MAB-73
132		Asst Sup Chief	GySgt	3043	1		MAF-61
133		Sup Admin Clerk	SSgt	3043	1		MAB-74; MAU 1-25
134		Av Sup Man	SSgt	3072	1		MAB-75; MAU 2-25
135		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		MAB-76
136	<u>Engineer</u>	Eng O	LtCol	1302	1		MAF-66
137		Eng O	Maj	1302	1		MAB-77
138		Engr Opns Chief	MSgt	1391	1		MAF-67
139		Asst Engr Opns Chief	GySgt	1371	1		MAB-78
140		Eng Equip Mech	SSgt	1341	1		MAB-79
141		Combat Eng Man	LCpl	1371	1		MAB-80
142	<u>Ordnance</u>	Ord O	Maj	2102	1		MAB-81
143		Ammo O	WO	2305	1		MAB-82
144		Avn Ord O	WO	6502	1		MAB-83
145		Ord Chief	MSgt	2311	1		MAB-84
146		Ammo Tech	Cpl	2311	1		MAB-85
147		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		MAB-86

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Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
148	<u>Embark</u>	Embark O	Maj	0430	I		MAF-64
149		Asst Embark O	Capt	0430	I		MAB-87; MAU 1-22
150		Asst Embark O	Lt	0430	I		MAB-88; MAU 2-22
151		Embark Chief	GySgt	0491	I		MAB-89; MAU 2-23
152		Embark NCO	SSgt	0441	I		MAF-65
153		Embark Man	Cpl	0431	I		MAB-90; MAU 1-24
154		Embark Man	Cpl	0431	I		MAB-91; MAU 2-24
155	<u>Comm/ Elec- tronics*</u>	CEO	Col	9906	I		MAF-78
156		Asst CEO (Opns)	LtCol	2502	I		MAB-92; MAU 1-2
157		Comm Chief (Opns)	MGySgt	2591	I		MAB-94
158		Asst Comm Chief (Opns)	MSgt	2591	I		MAB-95
159		Comm Maint Chief	MSgt	2861	I		MAB-96
160		Radio Freq Mgr	GySgt	2537	I		MAF-81
161		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	I		MAB-97
162		Asst CEO (Plans)	LtCol	2502	I		MAF-79
163		Asst Plans/Liaison O	Maj	2502	I		MAB-93
164		Comm Chief (Plans)	MGySgt	2591	I		MAF-80
165		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	I		MAF-82
166	<u>Adjutant</u>	Adj	Maj	0180	I		MAF-15
167		Asst Adj	Capt	0180	I		MAB-98
168		Admin Chief	MSgt	0193	I		MAF-16
169		Asst Admin Chief	GySgt	0151	I		MAB-99
170		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	I		MAF-21
171		Admin Clerk/DCP	Sgt	0151	I		MAF-17
172		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAB-100
173		Admin/CAS Rpt Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAB-101
174		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAB-100
175		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAF-18
176		Admin Clerk/Driver	LCpl	0151	I		MAF-18
177		Repro Man	Cpl	1500	I		MAB-102
178		CMCC Custodian	Lt	0180	I		MAB-103
179		CMCC/CMS NCOIC	SSgt	0193	I		MAF-20
180		CMCC Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAB-104; MAU 2-7
181		CMS Custodian/ CAS Rpt O	Lt	0180	I		MAB-105; MAU 1-4
182		CMCC Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAB-106; MAU 1-7
183		CMCC Clerk	LCpl	1521	I		MAF-23

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Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
184	<u>SJA</u>	SJA	Col	9914	1		MAF-83
185		Asst SJA	Maj	4402	1		MAB-107
186		Legal Chief	GySgt	4421		1	MAB-108
187		Legal Services Clerk	Sgt	4421		1	MAF-84
188		Legal Clerk	LCpl	4421		1	MAB-109
189	<u>Comp-</u>	Comptroller	Maj	9910	1		MAB-110
190	<u>troller</u>	Finance Chief	MSgt	3451		1	MAB-111
191		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151		1	MAB-112
192	<u>Data</u>	Force Info Sys Mgmt O	LtCol	4002	1		MAF-70
193	<u>Systems</u>	Asst FISMO/Ln O	Maj	4002	1		MAF-71
194		Data Systems O	Capt	4002	1		MAB-113
195	<u>Public</u>	PAO	Maj	4302	1		MAB-114
196	<u>Affairs</u>	Info Chief	SSgt	4312		1	MAB-115
197		Press Info/Photo	Cpl	4312		1	MAB-116
198	<u>Chaplain</u>	Chaplain	Capt	4100		1	MAF-75
199		Asst Chaplain	LCdr	4100		1	MAB-117
200		Chaplain Asst	LCpl	0151		1	MAB-118
201	<u>Medical</u>	Force Surgeon	Capt	2100		1	MAF-72
202		Asst Surgeon	Cdr	2500		1	MAB-119
203		Admin Asst	Cdr	2300		1	MAF-73
204		Med Chief	HMC	8424		1	MAB-120
205		Med Fld Tech	HMI	8404		1	MAF-74
206		Med CVC Tech	HM2	8424		1	MAB-121
207	<u>Dental</u>	Force Dental	Capt	2200		1	MAF-76
208		Admin Asst	HM2	8703		1	MAF-77

Totals: Marine Officer 79  
Enlisted 124

Navy Officer 7  
Enlisted 4

# MARDIS



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## NOTES:

1. This T/O lends itself to the composite MAF concept wherein a MAU Hq (enclosure (6)) and the one remaining deployed/non-deployed MAU Hq are consumed by the MAB Planning Hq to form a MAB Hq with nucleus H&S Co. (enclosure (5)). The MAF Planning Hq (enclosure (3)) is then flown in to finish forming the MAF Hq. The MAF Hq, therefore, is comprised of the MAF Planning Hq plus the MAB Planning Hq with two MAU Hq and the Nucleus H&S Co.
2. MAF-1, MAB-124, and MAU 1-3 are examples of remarks in the right-most column. MAF-1 means that the individual in a line number above can also be found in the MAF Planning Hq, line number 1. MAB-124 refers to the MAB Planning Hq T/O. Within the MAB Planning Hq there are two MAU Hq. The first MAU would be referred to in the remarks column as MAU 1-3, meaning the first MAU of the two, line number 3.
3. As the MAU's, MAB Planning HQ, and MAF Planning HQ, are being amalgamated into the MAF HQ, the communications platoon (1 officer and 33 enlisted men) of each MAU HQ is reassigned to the Communications Battalion which supports the MAF HQ.

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# MARDIS

## MAF PLANNING HEADQUARTERS

<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	<u>MAF</u>	Commander	MajGen	9903	1		
2	<u>Commander</u>	Aide-de-Camp	Capt	9910	1		
3		Driver	Cpl	3535		1	
4	<u>Dep MAF</u>	Dep Commander	BGen	9903	1		
5	<u>Commander</u>	Aide-de-Camp	Lt	9910	1		
6		Driver	Cpl	3535	1		
7	<u>Chief</u>	Chief of Staff	Col	9906	1		
8	<u>of Staff</u>	Staff Secretary	Maj	9910	1		
9		Admin Chief	GySgt	0193		1	
10		Admin Clerk/Driver	Sgt	0151		1	
11	<u>G-1</u>	AC/S G-1	Col	9907	1		
12		Asst G-1/Plans O	Maj	9910	1		
13		Personnel Chief	MSgt	0193		1	
14		Personnel Clerk	Cpl	0151		1	
15	<u>Adjutant</u>	Adjutant	Maj	0180	1		
16		Admin Chief	MSgt	0193		1	
17		Admin Clerk/DCP	Sgt	0151		1	
18		Admin Clerk/Driver	LCpl	0151		2	
19	<u>CMCC</u>	CMCC/CMS O	Lt	0170	1		
20		CMCC NCOIC	SSgt	0193		1	
21		CMCC/ADPE Clerk	Sgt	0151		1	
22		CMCC Clerk	Cpl	0151		1	
23		CMCC Clerk	LCpl	1521		1	
24	<u>G-2</u>	AC/S G-2	Col	9906	1		
25		Asst G-2/Plans O	LtCol	0205	1		
26		SSO/SIO	Maj	2602	1		
27		Intell Chief	MGySgt	0291		1	
28		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151		1	
29		Admin Clerk	LCpl	0151		1	
30		Asst Plans/Col I O	Maj	0202	1		
31		Intell Plans/Col I/II	MSgt	0241		1	
32		Intell Asst	Maj	2602	1		
33		Library MC&G Chief	GySgt	0231		1	
34		Target Intell O	Maj	0202	1		
35		Special Intell Chief	MSgt	0231		1	
36		Intell Asst	SSgt	0231		2	
37		CI Chief	MSgt	0211		1	
38	<u>G-3</u>	AC/S G-3	Col	9906	1		
39		Ops Chief	MGySgt	8711		1	

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# MARDIS

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
40		Plans 0	Col	9907	1		
41		Asst Plans 0 (Gnd)	LtCol	9911	1		
42		Asst Plans 0 (Air)	LtCol	9912	1		
43		Asst Plans 0 WEO	Maj	9911	1		
44		Asst Plans/JOPS	Maj	9910	1		
45		JOPS/TFFDO/	Sgt	4034		1	
46		Ops 0	LtCol	9910	1		
47		Asst Ops 0/WEO	Maj	0802	1		
48		Asst Ops 0/Air	Maj	9912	1		
49		EWO	Maj	2602	1		
50		Admin Chief	SSgt	0193			
51		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151			
52		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151			
53		Draftsman	Cpl	1400			
54		Admin Clerk	LCpl	0151			
55	<u>G-4</u>	AC/S G-4	Col	9906	1		
56		Asst G-4/Plans 0	LtCol	0402	1		
57		Log Chief	MGySgt	0491		1	
58		Opns 0	LtCol	0402	1		
59		Asst Opns 0	Capt	0402	1		
60		Plans 0/Supply	LtCol	3002	1		
61	<u>Supply</u>	Supply Chief	GySgt	3043		1	
62		Plans 0/	LtCol	3060	1		
		Aviation					
63		Plans 0/Ordnance	Maj	2102	1		
64		Embark/Trans 0	Maj	0430	1		
65		Embark NCO	SSgt	0441		1	
66		Engr 0	Maj	1302	1		
67		Engr Chief	GySgt	1371		1	
68		Log NCO	Sgt	0441		1	
69		Admin Clerk/Driver	Cpl	0151		2	
70	<u>Informa-</u>	Force Info Sys Mgt 0	LtCol	4002	1		
71	<u>tion</u>	Asst Force Info Sys					
	<u>Systems</u>	Mgt 0	Maj	4002	1		
	<u>Manage-</u>						
	<u>ment</u>						

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<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
72	<u>Medical</u>	Surgeon	Capt	2100		1	
73		Admin Asst	Cdr	2300		1	
74		Med Fld Tech	HMI	8404		1	
75	<u>Chaplain</u>	Chaplain	Capt	4100		1	
76	<u>Dental</u>	Dental O	Capt	2200		1	
77		Admin Asst	DT2	8703		1	
78	<u>Comm/ Elec- tronics</u>	CEO	Col	9906	1		
79		Asst CEO	LtCol		1		
80		Comm Ops Chief	MGySgt	2591		1	
81		Radio Freq Mgt					
		Tech ACEOI Mgr	GySgt	2537		1	
82		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151		1	
83	<u>SJA</u>	SJA	Col	9914	1		
84		Legal Serv Clerk	Sgt	4421		1	

Totals: Marine Officers 42  
Enlisted 42

Navy Officers 4  
Enlisted 2

# MARDIS





# MARDIS

Operational MAB Headquarters  
with  
H&S Company

<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	Command	Commanding General	BGen	9903	1		
2		Aide-de-Camp	Lt	9910	1		
3		Sergeant Major	SgtMaj	9999		1	
4		Food Tech Specialist	GySgt	3372		1	
5		Admin Clerk	SSgt	0151		1	
6		Driver	Sgt	3535		1	
7	Chief of Staff	Chief of Staff	Col	9911	1		
8		Staff Secretary	Maj	9910	1		
9		Admin Clerk	SSgt	0151		1	
10		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151		1	
11	G-1	AC/S G-1	LtCol	9910	1		
12		Asst G-1	Maj	9910	1		
13		Personnel/Admin Chief	GySgt	0193		1	
14		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151		1	
	G-2	<u>Executive Unit</u>					
15		AC/S G-2	LtCol	0202	1		
16		Asst G-2	Maj	0202	1		
17		Intel Chief	MGySgt	0291		1	
18		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151		1	
19		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151		1	
		<u>Combat Intell Unit</u>					
20		Combat Intell O	Maj	0202	1		
21		Ground Order of Battle (OB) O	Capt	0202	1		
22		Ground OB Analyst	GySgt	0231		1	
23		Air OB O	Capt	0202	1		
24		Air OB Analyst	GySgt	0231		1	
25		Photo II	GySgt	0241		1	
26		Tgt Intell O	Capt	0202	1		
27		Tgt Analyst	GySgt	0231		1	
28		Admin Clerk	Pfc			2	
		<u>Counter Intell Unit</u>					
29		Staff CI O	Capt	0210	1		
30		Staff CI Chief	SSgt	0211		1	
31		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151		1	

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<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
		<u>Special Intell Unit</u>					
32		Special Security O	Capt	2602	1		
33		Special Sec. Comm					
		Team Chief	Sgt	2651	1		
34		Special Intell					
		Comm Oper.	Cpl	2651	2		
	G-3	<u>Executive Unit</u>					
35		AC/S G-3	Col	9911	1		
36		Asst G-3	LtCol	9910	1		
37		Ops Chief	MGySgt	8711	1		
38		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	1		
39		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		
		<u>Operations Unit</u>					
40		Asst G-3/Operations	LtCol	0302	1		1802 alternate MOS
41		AirO	Maj	9912	1		
42		NGFO	LCdr	1100		1	
43		ArtyO/WEO	Maj	0802	1		5715 additional MOS
44		EWO	Capt	2602	1		
45		Opns Asst	MSgt	8711	1		
46		Opns Asst/NBC	SSgt	0848	1		5711 additional MOS
47		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	1		
48		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	2		
49		Draftsman	Cpl	1411	2		
50	G-4	AC/S G-4	Col	9912	1		
51		Asst G-4/Gd Opns	Maj	0402	1		
52		Asst G-4/Air Opns	Maj	0402	1		
53		Log Opns Chief	MGySgt	0491	1		
54		Asst Log Opns Chief	GySgt	0491	2		
55		Log Clerk	Cpl	0441	2		
56		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	2		
57	Embarka-	Embark O	Capt	0430	1		
58	tion	Asst Embark O	Lt	0430	1		
59		Embark Chief	GySgt	0491	1		
60		Embark Man	Cpl	0431	1		

# MARDIS

# MARDIS

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
61	Ordnance	Ordnance O	Maj	2102	I		
62		Ammo O	WO	2305	I		
63		Avn Ordnance O	WO	6502	I		
64		Ordnance Chief	MSgt	2311	I		
65		Ammo Tech	Cpl	2311	I		
66		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	I		
67	Engineer	Engineer O	Maj	1302	I		
68		Engineer Chief	GySgt	1371	I		
69		Engineer Equip Mech	SSgt	1341	I		
70		Cmbt Engineer Man	LCpl	1371	I		
71	Supply	Supply O	Maj	3002	I		
72		Ground Sup O	Capt	3002	I		
73		Aviation Sup O	Capt	3060	I		
74		Supply Chief	MSgt	3043	I		
75		Supply Admin Clerk	SSgt	3043	I		
76		Aviation Sup Man	SSgt	3072	I		
77		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	I		
78	Motor	MTO	Maj	3502	I		
79	Transport	MT Chief	MSgt	3537	I		
80		MT Maint Chief	SSgt	3529	I		
81		Dispatcher	LCpl	3531	I		
82	Communi- cations/ Elec- tronics	CEO	LtCol	2502	I		
83		Asst CEO	Maj	2502	I		
84		Comm Chief	MGySgt	2591	I		
85		Asst Comm Chief	MSgt	2591	I		
86		Comm Maint Chief	MSgt	2861	I		
87		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	I		
88	Comp- troller	Comptroller	Maj	9910	I		
89		Finance Chief	MSgt	3451	I		
90		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	I		
91	Medical	Surgeon	Cdr	2100		I	
92		Med Chief	HMC	8424		I	
93		Med CVC Tech	HM2	8424		I	

MARDIS



# MARDIS

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
94	Staff	SJA	Maj	4402	1		
95	Judge	Legal Chief	GySgt	4421	1		
96	Advocate	Legal Clerk	LCpl	4421	1		
97	Adjutant	Adjutant	Capt	0170	1		
98		CMS Cust/Cas Rpt O	Lt	0180	1		
99		CMCC Custodian	Lt	0180	1		
100		Admin/Cas Rpt Clerk	SSgt	0151	1		
101		Admin/Cas Rpt Clerk	Cpl	0151	2		
102		CMCC Clerk	Cpl	0151	2		
103		CMS Clerk	Cpl	0151	1		
104		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0131	1		
105		Repro Man	Cpl	1541	1		
106	Public	PAO	Maj	4302	1		
107	Affairs	Info Chief	SSgt	4312	1		
108		Press Info/Photo	Cpl	4312	1		
109	Chaplain	Chaplain	LCdr	4100		1	
110		Chaplain Asst	LCpl	0151	1		
111	Data Systems	Data Systems O	Capt	4002	1		

Totals:	Marine	Officers	42
		Enlisted	<u>73</u>
	Navy	Officers	<u>3</u>
		Enlisted	<u>2</u>

# MARDIS

# MARDIS

## HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
112	Company	Commanding Officer	Maj	9910	1		
113	HQ	Executive Officer	Capt	9910	1		
114		1st Sgt	1stSgt	9999	1		
115		GySgt	GySgt	0369	1		
116	Personnel/	Personnel Admin Chief	GySgt	0193	1		
117	Admin	Admin Clerk	Sgt	0131	1		
118		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0121	1		
119		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	3		
120	Supply	Sup O	Lt	3002	1		
121		Sup Admin Chief	SSgt	3043	1		
122		Sup Admin Man	Cpl	3043	1		
123		Warehouse Chief	Sgt	3051	1		
124		Warehouse Man	Pfc	3051	2		
125	Food	Mess Chief	SSgt	3371	1		
126	Services	Cook	Sgt	3371	2		
127		Cook	LCpl	3371	2		
128		Baker	Sgt	3311	1		
129		Subsistence Sup Man	Cpl	3061	1		
130	Main-	Maintenance Chief	GySgt	1371	1		
131	tenance/	Inf Wpns Repairman	Cpl	2111	1		
132	Ordnance	Inf Wpns Repairman	LCpl	2111	1		
133		Police NCO	Sgt	0311	1		
134		Electrician	Cpl	1141	1		
135		Electrician	LCpl	1141	1		
136		Carpenter	Cpl	1371	1		
137		Carpenter	LCpl	1371	1		
138		Tractor Equip					
		Operator	LCpl	1345	2		
139		Refrigeration Mech	Cpl	1161	1		
140		Metal Worker-Welder	Cpl	1316	1		
141		Generator-Repairman	Cpl	1142	1		
142		Admin Clerk	LCpl	0151	2		
143	Motor	MTO	WO	3502	1		
144	Trans-	MT Chief	SSgt	3529	1		
145	port	Maintenance Chief	Sgt	3529	1		
146		Dispatcher	Sgt	3531	1		
147		Auto Mechanic	Cpl	3521	1		
148		MV Operator	Pfc	3531	5		(5-ton Trks)

# MARDIS

# MARDIS

<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
149	Operations/ Training	Opns/Trng O	Lt	9910	1		
150		Opns/Trng Chief	SSgt	0369	1		
151		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		
152	Medical	Medical Chief	HMC	8404		1	(MAB Surgeon used)
153		Corpsman	Hm2	8404		3	
154	Security Traffic Platoon	Platoon Commander	Lt	9911	1		
155		Security Chief	SSgt	8151	1		
156		Security NCO	Sgt	8151	3		
157		Security NCO	Cpl	8151	3		
158		Security Guard	Pfc	8151	18		
Totals:				Marine	Officers	6	
					Enlisted	<u>71</u>	
				Navy	Officers	0	
					Enlisted	<u>4</u>	

## MAB HQ + H&S CO TOTALS

Marine	Officers	<u>48</u>
	Enlisted	<u>144</u>
Navy	Officers	<u>3</u>
	Enlisted	<u>6</u>

# MARDIS



# MARDIS

MAB PLANNING HEADQUARTERS<sup>1,2</sup>

with  
Nucleus H&S Company  
and  
Two MAU Headquarters

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
1	<u>Command</u>	Commanding General	BGen	9903	1		Filled when MAB deployed. See MAF-4
2		Aide-de-Camp	Lt	9910	1		Filled when MAB deployed. See MAF-5
3		Driver	Cpl	3535	1		Filled when MAB deployed. See MAF-6
4	<u>Chief of Staff</u>	Chief of Staff	Col	9907	1		
5		Staff Secretary	Maj	9910	1		
6		Admin Chief	SSgt	0151	1		
7		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	1		
8	<u>G-1</u>	AC/S G-1	LtCol	9910	1		MAU 2-2
9		Asst G-1	Maj	9910	1		
10		Admin Chief	GySgt	0193	1		MAU 1-5
11		Asst Admin Chief	SSgt	0193	1		MAU 2-5
12		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	1		
13	<u>G-2</u>	AC/S G-2	LtCol	0202	1		
14		Intell Chief	MSgt	0291	1		
15		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	1		
16		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		
17		Ground OB O	Maj	0202	1		MAU 2-8
18		Asst Ground OB O	Capt	0202	1		MAU 1-9
19		Ground OB Analyst	GySgt	0231	1		Add MOS 0205/9960.
20		Intell Specialist	Cpl	0231	1		MAU 2-10
21		Air OB O	Maj	0202	1		MAU 1-12
22		Asst Air OB O	Capt	0202	1		MAU 1-8
23		Air OB Analyst	GySgt	0231	1		MAU 2-9;
24		Intell Specialist	Cpl	0231	1		Add MOS 0205/9960.
25		Tgt Intell O	Capt	0202	1		MAU 1-10
26		Tgt Analyst	GySgt	0231	1		MAU 2-12
27		Photo II Chief	GySgt	0241	1		
28		Photo II	SSgt	0241	1		MAU 1-11
29		Photo II	Sgt	0241	1		MAU 2-11
30		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		MAU 1-13
31		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		MAU 2-13
32		SSO/SIO	Capt	2602	1		
33		SS Comm Chief	Sgt	2651	1		
34		Intell Comm Oper	Cpl	2651	3		
35		Staff CI O	Capt	0210	1		
36		CI Chief	SSgt	0211	1		
37		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		

# MARDIS

# MARDIS

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
38	<u>G-3</u>	AC/S G-3	Col	9906	1		MAU 1-1
39		Asst G-3	LtCol	9912	1		MAU 2-14
40		Opns Chief	MGySgt	8711		1	
41		Asst Opns Chief	MSgt	8711		1	
42		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151		1	
43		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151		1	
44		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151		1	MAU 1-20
45		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151		1	MAU 2-20
46		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151		1	
47		Draftsman	Cpl	1411		1	
48		Ln O	LtCol	0302	1		MAU 1-14
49		Ln Chief	SSgt	0369		1	MAU 1-49
50		Air O	Maj	9912	1		MAU 1-15
51		Asst Air O	Capt	9912	1		MAU 2-15
52		Air Opns Man	Cpl	7041		1	MAU 1-19
53		Air Opns Man	Cpl	7041		1	MAU 2-19
54		NGFO	LCdr	1100		1	
55		Arty O/WEO	Maj	0802	1		MAU 1-17
56		Asst Arty O/WEO	Capt	0802	1		MAU 2-17
57		Opns Asst/NBC	SSgt	0848		1	MAU 1-18; Add MOS 5711.
58		Opns Asst/NBC	SSgt	0848		1	MAU 2-18; Add MOS 5711.
59		EWO	Capt	2602	1		
60		Opns Asst	SSgt	0369		1	MAU 2-49
61	<u>G-4</u>	AC/S G-4	Col	9907	1		MAU 2-1
62		Log Chief	MGySgt	0491		1	
63		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151		2	
64		Asst G-4 (ground)	Maj	0402	1		MAU 1-21
65		Log Opns Chief (G)	GySgt	0491		1	MAU 1-23
66		Log Clerk	Cpl	0491		2	MAU 1-26
67		Asst G-4 (air)	Maj	0402	1		MAU 2-21
68		Log Opns Chief (A)	GySgt	0491		1	
69		Log Clerk	Cpl	0491		2	MAU 2-26
70	<u>Supply</u>	Supply O	Maj	3002	1		
71		Supply O (G)	Capt	3002	1		
72		Supply O (A)	Capt	3060	1		
73		Supply Chief	MSgt	3043		1	
74		Sup Admin Clerk	SSgt	3043		1	MAU 1-25
75		AV Sup Man	SSgt	3072		1	MAU 2-25
76		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151		1	

# MARDIS

# MARDIS

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
77	<u>Engineer</u>	Eng O	Maj	1302	I		
78		Eng Opns Chief	GySgt	1371	I		
79		Eng Equip Mech	SSgt	1341	I		
80		Combat Eng Man	LCpl	1371	I		
81	<u>Ordnance</u>	Ord O	Maj	2102	I		
82		Ammo O	WO	2305	I		
83		Avn Ord O	WO	6502	I		
84		Ord Chief	MSgt	2311	I		
85		Ammo Tech	Cpl	2311	I		
86		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	I		
87	<u>Embark</u>	Embark O	Capt	0430	I		MAU 1-22
88		Asst Embark O	Lt	0430	I		MAU 2-22
89		Embark Chief	GySgt	0491	I		MAU 2-23
90		Embark Man	Cpl	0431	I		MAU 1-24
91		Embark Man	Cpl	0431	I		MAU 2-24
92	<u>Comm/ Elec- tronics</u>	CEO	LtCol	2502	I		MAU 1-2
93		Asst CEO	Maj	2502	I		
94		Comm Chief	MGySgt	2591	I		
95		Asst Comm Chief	MSgt	2591	I		
96		Comm Maint Chief	MSgt	2861	I		
97		Admin Clerk	Sgt	0151	I		
98	<u>Adjutant</u>	Adjutant	Capt	0180	I		
99		Admin Chief	GySgt	0151	I		
100		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0151	2		
101		Admin/Cas Rpt	Cpl	0151	I		
102		Repro Man	Cpl	1500	I		
103		CMCC Custodian	Lt	0180	I		
104		CMCC Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAU 2-7
105		CMS Custodian	Lt	0180	I		MAU 1-4
106		CMCC Clerk	Cpl	0151	I		MAU 1-7
107		SJA	Maj	4402	I		
108	<u>SJA</u>	Legal Chief	GySgt	4421	I		
109		Legal Clerk	LCpl	4421	I		
110	<u>Comp- troller</u>	Comptroller	Maj	9910	I		
111		Finance Chief	MSgt	3451	I		
112		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	I		

MARDIS



# MARDIS

Line #	Section	Description	Grade	MOS	MAR	NAV	Remarks
113	<u>Data Systems</u>	Data Sys 0	Capt	4002	1		
114	<u>Public Affairs</u>	PAO	Maj	4302	1		
115		Info Chief	SSgt	4312	1		
116		Press Info/Photo	Cpl	4312	1		
117	<u>Chaplain</u>	Chaplain	LCdr	4100		1	
118		Chaplain Asst	LCpl	0151		1	
119	<u>Medical</u>	Surgeon	Cdr	2500		1	
120		Med Chief	HMC	8424		1	
121		Med CVC Tech	HM2	8424		1	

## NUCLEUS HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY<sup>3</sup>

122	<u>H&amp;S CO</u>	Commanding Officer	Maj	9910	1		
123	<u>HQ</u>	Executive Officer	Lt	9910	1		MAU 2-4
124		Sergeant Major	SgtMaj	9999	2		MAU 1-3 and MAU 2-3
125		Gunnery Sergeant	GySgt	0369	1		
126		Prop NCO/Police Sgt	Sgt	8911	1		MAU 1-50
127		Asst Prop NCO/Police Sgt	Cpl	8911	1		MAU 2-50
128	<u>H&amp;S CO</u>	Personnel/Admin Chief	GySgt	0193	1		
129	<u>Personnel/</u>	Admin Clerk	Sgt	0131	1		MAU 1-6
130	<u>Admin</u>	Admin Clerk	Cpl	0131	1		MAU 2-6
131		Admin Clerk	Cpl	0121	1		
132		Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	2		
133	<u>H&amp;S CO</u>	Supply O/MMO <sup>4</sup>	Lt	3002	1		
134	<u>Supply/</u>	Sup Admin Chief	SSgt	3043	1		
135	<u>Main-</u>	Supply Admin Man	Cpl	3043	1		
136	<u>tenance</u>	Warehouse Chief	Sgt	3051	1		
137		Warehouse Man	Pfc	3051	2		
138		Maintenance Chief	GySgt	1371	1		
139		Inf Weapons Repairman	LCpl	2111	1		
140		Admin Clerk	LCpl	0151	2		

# MARDIS

# MARDIS

<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
141		Food Services Spec	Cpl	3371	1		MAU 1-51
142		Food Services Spec	LCpl	3371	1		MAU 2-51
143		Driver	Cpl	3531	2		MAU 1-52 and MAU 2-52
144		Driver	Pfc	3531	4		MAU 1-27/31 & MAU-27/31
145		MT Mechanic	Cpl	3521	2		MAU 1-53 and MAU 2-53
146	H&S CO	Opns/Trng Chief	GySgt	0369	1		MAU 1-16
147	Opera-	Asst Opns/Trng Chief	GySgt	0369	1		MAU 2-16
148	tions/ <u>Training</u>	Admin Clerk	Pfc	0151	1		

Totals:	Marine Officers	46
	Enlisted	<u>111</u>
	Navy Officers	<u>3</u>
	Enlisted	<u>3</u>

## NOTES:

1. This T/O lends itself to the composite MAB/MAF concept wherein the MAB Planning Hq would consume any two MAU hq's in order to function as a MAB Hq. The MAB Planning Hq is shown in this enclosure as having both MAU Hq's and its Nucleus H&S Co.
2. See note #2 in the MAF Hq T/O (enclosure (2)) for an explanation of the remarks column above.
3. If committed to battle, T/O would be identical to the H&S Co. T/O for the Operational MAB Hq. Under this circumstance, additional staffing beyond that identified in this paper would be required.
4. Minimum work required of MMO. Concept envisions majority of T/E packaged and rolling stock preserved in warehouse. This is a H&S Co, III MAF model. Equipment not preserved would be for use of the deployed/deployable MAU Hqs. The nucleus H&S Co. Hq vehicle support would be of the non-tactical variety for garrison use.

# MARDIS





# MARDIS

## MAU HEADQUARTERS

<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	Command (Note 1)	Commanding Officer	Col	9906	1		
2		Executive Officer	LtCol	9910	1		
3		Sergeant Major	SgtMaj	9999	1		
4	S-1/Adj	S-1/Adj/S&C Officer	Capt/Lt	0180	1		
5		Admin Chief	GySgt	0193	1		
6		Admin Man	Cpl	0131	1		
7		Admin Man/Driver	LCpl	0151	1		
8	S-2	Intelligence Officer	Maj/Capt	0202	1		
9		Asst Intel Off/Air		0205/			
		Observer	Capt/Lt	9960	1		
10		S-2 Chief	GySgt	0231	1		
11		Imagery Interpreter	Sgt	0241	1		
12		Intelligence Specialist	Cpl	0231	1		
13		Intel Specialist/ Driver	LCpl	0151	1		
14	S-3	Operations Officer	LtCol/ Maj	0302	1		
15		Asst Ops/Air Ln 0	Maj	9912	1		
16		Operations Chief	GySgt	0369	1		
17		Asst Ops/FSCC	Maj/Capt	0802	1		
18		Asst Opns/FSCC Chief	SSgt	0848/ 5711	1		
19		Operations Man	Cpl	7041	1		
20		Admin Man/Driver	LCpl	0151	1		
21	S-4	Logistics Officer	Maj	0402	1		
22		Asst Log/Emb 0	Capt/Lt	0402	1		
23		Logistics Chief	GySgt	0491	1		
24		Embark NCO	Sgt	0431	1		
25		Supply Admin Man	Sgt	3041	1		
26		Logistics Man/Driver	LCpl	0441	2		
27		Driver	Pfc	3531	2		
28-48	Comm Plt				1	33	

# MARDIS

# MARDIS

<u>Line #</u>	<u>Section</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Grade</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>NAV</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
49	Head-	Headquarters					
	quarters	Commandant	SSgt	0369	1		
50	Comman-	Prop NCO/Police	Sgt	8911	1		
51	dant	Food Service					
	Section	Specialist	Cpl	3371	1		
52		Driver	Cpl	3531	1		
53		MT Mechanic	Cpl	3521	1		

Totals: Marine Officers 11  
Enlisted 57

Note 1: If the commanding officer is a ground officer, the executive officer will be a Naval aviator/NFO and vice versa.

# MARDIS

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

MAGTF HQ ORGANIZATION	Current		Proposed		T/O		Manning Level	
	Current T/O	Manning Level	Proposed T/O	Manning Level	Increase (+)/Decrease (-)	T/O	Increase (+)/Decrease (-)	
11 MAF (MAF Plan HQ)	-----	-----	42/42	42/42	4/2	4/2	+42/+42	+4/+2
4th MAB (Opnl MAB w/H&S Co)	24/34	0/0	48/144	3/6	48/144	3/6	+24/+110	+3/+6
6th MAB (MAB Plan HQ w/H&S Co)	-----	-----	24/62	3/3	24/62	3/3	+24/+62	+3/+3
32d MAU2	-----	10/52	0/0	11/57	0/0	11/57	+11/+57	+1/+5
34th MAU2	11/57	10/52	0/0	11/57	0/0	11/57	0/0	+1/+5
1 MAF (MAF Plan HQ)	36/43	0/0	42/42	4/2	42/42	4/2	+6/-1	+4/+2
5th MAB (MAB Plan HQ w/H&S Co)	-----	-----	24/62	3/3	24/62	3/3	+24/+62	+3/+3
7th MAB (Opnl MAB w/H&S Co)	53/123	4/14	48/144	3/6	48/144	3/6	-5/+21	+31/+118
111 MAF (MAF Plan HQ)	43/65	4/2	42/42	4/2	42/42	4/2	-1/-23	+4/+2
1st MAB (MAB Plan HQ w/H&S Co) <sup>3</sup>	50/144	4/9	24/62	3/3	24/62	3/3	-26/-82	-1/-6
9th MAB (Opnl MAB w/H&S Co) <sup>4</sup>	-----	-----	48/144	3/6	48/144	3/6	+48/+144	+3/+6
31st MAU2	11/57	0/0	11/57	0/0	11/57	0/0	0/0	+1/+5
37th MAU2	-----	-----	11/57	0/0	11/57	0/0	+11/+57	+1/+57
	228/523	12/25	198/454	4/9	386/972	30/33	158/449	188/518
							18/8	26/24

NOTES:

- Figures in each column, in order, represent Marine officer/enlisted and Navy officer/enlisted strengths.
- A MAU structure and T/O of 11/57 has been approved. MAU HQ's being staffed by Lant/Pac at manning levels indicated. MAU Comm Plt (1/33) may be assigned to reconfigured Comm Bn when PLT's MAU not activated.
- 1st Bde redesignated 1st MAB.
- HQ, 9th MAB current T/O of 4/0 is contained in current 111 MAF T/O, and is not staffed separately by HQMC.

Less 3 MPS Bde Programmed POM 83, 85, 87	51/78	0/0
Less 2 MAU HQ POM 82, 83	22/114	0/0
	115/326	26/24





# MARDIS

## IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

### 1. Implementation Concept

a. General. Even with a windfall increase in personnel end strength and funding for equipment procurement, this plan cannot be implemented in toto. However, it is possible to initially implement one-third of the permanent MAGTF structure and later, through POM initiatives, introduce the balance of the structure. To this end, the MAGTF headquarters would be introduced through a phased effort: Phase I (Initial Test), Phase II (Evaluation and Programming), and Phase III (Final Implementation).

### b. Implementation Schedule

(1) Phase I (Initial Test) (FY 83). With minor equipment and personnel adjustments, FMFPac could organize III MAF into the model recommended by this paper during FY 83. The risk, operationally, would be negligible since no major headquarters or forces would be shifted in location and the capability to deploy III MAF would not be adversely affected. Indeed, with 9th MAB a readily deployable force, the capabilities would be increased. The specific requirements to implement this phase are as follows:

(a) 1st Brigade (MAB Planning Headquarters, Nucleus H&S Company, and two MAU Headquarters)

1 Redesignate 1st Brigade Headquarters as 1st MAB Headquarters.

2 Reconfigure 1st MAB Headquarters T/O into the model of the MAB Planning Headquarters supported by two MAU headquarters and the nucleus H&S Company. MAU deployments would continue but with two MAU Headquarters rotating. See enclosure (7) for T/O and Manning level requirements.

3 Redistribute T/E assets to the 1st MAB Nucleus H&S Company from commands where overages exist. The T/E concept for a nucleus H&S Company specifies that the majority of T/E assets will be preserved for contingency use (current III MAF H&S Co model). The lack of T/E assets, therefore, during this phase of implementation will not bias the evaluation of the concept since those assets would not be used in peacetime in any event. MAU Headquarters will be supported by the Company assets.

(b) Headquarters, III MAF (MAF Planning Headquarters). The current III MAF staff would be organized and staffed in accordance with the T/O for the MAF Planning

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### The AASG

The Advanced Amphibious Study Group was formed in 1974 to provide the Marine Corps a capability to meet significant planning requirements on critical issues of the mid-range period. The Group functions under the cognizance of the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. The membership is comprised of colonels and lieutenant colonels, ground and air officers, with varied operational/staff experience and broad academic and professional education; a civilian analyst is also assigned. The mission of the Group is as follows:

"To study questions and issues of critical importance to the Marine Corps, principally in the midrange period; to develop original concepts and solutions; and, where appropriate, to recommend the means and methods of implementing the solutions proposed."

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